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The ¯rst chapter analyzes, in the context of one-sided delegated bargaining, how
a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper
incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) AND gain strategic advantage against
a third party (a buyer). In a context with risk-neutral players, moral hazard and ad-
verse selection problems in the delegation relationship, and absence of commitment
e®ect, a linear contract is optimal. When delegation contracts have commitment
value, the seller can gain substantially by imposing a minimum price, above which
she pays the delegate a commission. The interaction between commitment (through
minimum price) and incentives depends on the nature of the agency problem. Incen-
tives andcommitment are substitutewhen the delegate's unobservable e®ort improves
xiihis bargaining position, but are neither substitute nor complement when his e®ort
increases chances of ¯nding a buyer. In most cases, the seller's strategic manipulation
of the delegation contract may cause bargaining failures between the delegate and the
buyer.
The second and third chapters examine, in a principal-monitor-agent framework,
the use of the timing to monitor the agent as a contractinginstrument. First, we show
that, under some conditions, the optimal contract with an ex post monitor depends
onobtaininga signal afterthe agent exertede®ort andnot on what is being monitored
(agent's e®ort or productivity). This result extends to a self-interested monitor for
any possible level of collusion between the agent and the monitor (i.e., information
concealment or manipulation). In the third chapter we analyze the optimal moni-
toring timing in di®erent collusion environments. Ex ante monitoring (supervising)
is optimal for weak punishment and an informative signal, and ex post monitoring
(auditing) is optimal otherwise. This result extends to collusion with hard and non-
forgeable information, but may be reverted when information is hard and forgeable
or soft. In these cases, collusion imposes costs to both auditing and supervising and,
under some circumstances, supervising is more likely to be optimal when the signal
is noisy even for unbounded punishments, or when punishment schemes are weak
(independently of the signal's noise).
xiiiChapter 1
Delegated Bargaining: Agency Problems and
Commitment
1.1 Introduction
In many economic situations, delegates are hired to play games on behalf of their
principals. Consider the owner of a car dealership, who hires sales managers to sell
cars to customers. Between the owner and her managers, there often exist various
types of agency problems (moral hazard, adverse selection and combinations of both),
with which the principal-agent literature has extensively dealt. However, in most of
this literature, the game the agent is hired to play with other parties (e.g., bargaining
between sales managers and car buyers) is suppressed in the studies of optimal agency
contracts (the agent' actions alone determine the principal's payo® subject to perhaps
exogenous randomization by nature). On the other hand, since Schelling [52], it has
long been recognized that the principal may gain strategic advantages against a third
party by properly designing a contract for the agent. In the context of car dealership,
the agency contract between the dealership owner and her sales manager may a®ect
1how the sales manager and car buyers bargain and hence ultimately the terms of
trade. A large amount of subsequent work has investigated when this commitment
e®ect can arise and its implications in various economic situations.1 But not much
attention has been paid to the interactions between agency problems and commit-
ment considerations in the delegation relationship. In this chapter, we analyze such
interactions in an important class of delegation games, delegated bargaining.
Speci¯cally, we study the following one-sided delegation game. A seller of one
indivisible good hires a delegate (an intermediary) to sell the good for her. They
sign a contract, which becomes public knowledge. At the time the agency contract is
signed, neither the seller nor the delegate knows the valuationof the (potential) buyer
but they know its distribution. After exerting some unobservable \sales e®orts", the
delegate meets a buyer and then ¯nds out the buyer's valuation. Then they bargain
over a price, so bargaining is conducted under complete information. If the delegate
and the buyer agree on a price, the buyer gets the good and makes the payment,
and the delegate delivers the payment to the seller. The seller pays the delegate a
wage according to the delegation contract. The seller only observes the sale revenue
the delegate brings back to her. We assume that the delegate and the buyer cannot
collude and the delegate cannot hide money from the seller. All the players are
assumed to be risk-neutral. The model is obviously stylized, but seems to capture
1 See, e.g., Vickers [59], Fershtman and Judd [18, 17] , Sklivas [54], Dewatripont [13], Gal-Or
[21, 22, 23], Fershtman, Judd and Kalai [19], Katz [32], Hermalin [28, 29], Caillaud, Jullien and
Picard [8], Martimort [45], Baye, Crocker and Ju [4], La®ont and Martimort [40], Fershtman and
Kalai [20], Corts and Neher [10], Kockesen and Ok [37].
2some of the essential features in the car dealership example and many other similar
situations with trade intermediaries.
We suppose that there are both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in
the delegation relationship. That is, the delegate's e®ort is not observable to the
seller; and furthermore, the delegates can di®er in their disutility of e®ort, which
is not observable to the seller either. Ignoring the commitment e®ect of delegation
contracts, we can characterize the seller's optimal mechanism. Using the insights
of the earlier literature (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom [30], La®ont and Tirole [44],
and McAfee and McMillan [46]), we show that a contract linear in sales revenue can
implement the seller's optimal mechanism under certain mild conditions. This is
done in Section 1.2. The case without commitment considerations serves as a useful
benchmark.
We then turn to the case with commitment e®ect. We assume that delegation
contracts are perfectly observable to potential buyers and cannot be renegotiated.2
If the seller knew exactly the buyer's valuation, then she could achieve \full com-
mitment" by using a \target contract". A target contract requires the delegate to
2 Several papers, e.g., Katz [32], Caillaud, Jullien and Picard [8], Dewatripont [13], Fershtman
and Kalai [20], Corts and Neher [10], Kockesen and Ok [37], have examined whether delegation still
has commitment power if delegation contracts are not perfectly observable or can be renegotiated
secretly. By and large, these papers show that unobservability and renegotiation of delegation
contracts limit but do not eliminate the commitment e®ects of delegation. Interestingly, asymmetric
information between the principals and their delegates is usually necessary for delegation contracts
to have commitment e®ects when renegotiation is allowed. In practice, the seller can maintain the
credibility not to renegotiate delegation contracts for reputation reasons if she hires the delegate to
do repeated sales with di®erent customers or hires multiple delegates to conduct similar sales. See
more discussions in Section 1.4.
3get a certain price for the good, otherwise he is paid nothing or even faces some
penalty. Without uncertainty, the seller can set the price target exactly equal to the
buyer's valuation, which commits the delegate to get this price and leave the buyer
with no surplus.3 In reality, the seller often does not observe directly the buyer's
valuation, and the agency problems make it di±cult for the agent to communicate
his knowledge about the buyer perfectly to the seller. In such cases the target con-
tracts are not feasible anymore, thus the commitment power of delegation contracts
is limited and the seller usually cannot achieve full commitment. In Section 1.3, we
show that the seller can still achieve a substantial amount of commitment power by
imposing a minimum price with a linear sharing contract. A minimum price can give
the delegate bargaining advantage because it raises his threat point. With a standard
Rubinstein bargaining model, it can be easily shown that the higher the minimum
price, the higher the ¯nal sales price, provided that the buyer's valuation is higher
than the minimum price. We derive the seller's optimal minimum price and optimal
commission rate jointly. Under fairly general conditions, the seller sets a minimum
price that is strictly greater than the lower bound of the buyer's valuations. This
means that when the buyer's valuation is below this minimum price, the delegate
and the buyer cannot reach a deal despite that there are positive gains from trade.
We then investigate how the minimum price interacts with the commission rate to
3 Fershtman et al. [19] show that with target contracts, any Pareto optimal outcome in a
principals-only game can be achieved when (1) every principal can hire a delegate; (2) contracts are
observable and not renegotiable; and (3) there are no agency problems. Kahenmann [31] reaches
similar conclusions in the context of Rubinstein bargaining.
4provide an optimal balance between commitment and incentive considerations.
One excuse of our focus on contracts linear in sales revenue above minimum price
is simply that analysis ofmore complicatedschemes is not tractable. This focus is also
motivated by the observation that it is commonly used in real life. In car dealerships,
\most salesmen are paid a commission which is usually 25-30 % of the gross pro¯t
(based on dealer invoice, not incentives) on every car they sell." (Eskeldson [14], p.
46) To us, the most interesting part of the agency contracts for car salesmen is what
commission is based on. As shown in Section 1.2, when agency problems are the
only consideration, the optimal contract requires commissions to be based on the
seller's pro¯t, i.e., sales revenue minus the seller's cost. However, in the U.S. car
dealership business, the real cost of a car to the dealer is usually not its invoice price.
Car manufacturers typically o®er dealers \holdbacks", which pays back the dealers a
certain percentage (usually 2-3 %) of the invoice prices when cars are actually sold.
In addition to dealer holdbacks, car manufacturers o®er many other di®erent kinds of
incentives (dealer rebates, volume discounts, credit discounts, etc.) from time to time
(and can vary across dealerships). With all these provisions from car manufacturers
taken into account, the real cost per car for the dealer is substantially lower than
its invoice cost (of course, a small operational cost per car has to be added). Since
commissions of car salesmen are calculated on the basis of invoice prices but not on
dealer's real cost, car salesmen will not be willing to sell cars under invoice prices.
Thus invoice prices in the car dealership example can be viewed as the minimum
5prices in our model, and our analysis provides a justi¯cation for using invoice prices
to calculate commissions for car salesmen.
We ¯nd that the nature of the agency problem a®ects how the seller should op-
timally balance commitment and incentives. Speci¯cally, we consider two kinds of
moral hazard problems by the delegate. In the ¯rst scenario, the delegate exerts
\bargaining e®ort" which increases his bargaining power against the buyer (e.g., do-
ing research about the customers and the product, taking courses to improve bargain-
ing skills). In this case, commitment through minimum prices and incentives for the
delegate are substitutes for the seller, that is, higher minimum prices are associated
with lower incentives for the delegate and hence lower e®ort by the delegate. As a
result, high type agents are given more discretion in making deals with customers and
are held responsible for the outcomes to a greater degree. In another scenario, the
delegate exerts \marketing e®ort" which increases the chance that he ¯nds a buyer
(e.g., doing advertisement, providing good services, having clean showrooms). With
\marketing e®ort", commitment through minimum prices and incentives for the del-
egate are neither substitutes nor complements. This means that for some exogenous
changes in the environment, higher minimum prices are associated with higher in-
centives for the delegate and hence higher e®ort by the delegate; but for some other
exogenous changes in the environment, minimum prices and incentives move in the
opposite directions.
We also ¯nd that strategic delegation may lead to bargaining failures under gen-
6eral conditions in our model.4 In our model, the delegate and the buyer bargain under
complete information, yet sometimes they fail to reach agreements because the dele-
gate is pre-committed by the seller to bargain aggressively all the time. This is closely
related to Haller and Holden [27], who show that a heterogeneous group of people
sometimes want to impose a super-majority rati¯cation rule on the bargaining out-
comes their delegate reached with a third party in order to gain strategic advantage.
As a result, an agreement bene¯cial from the perspective of the median voter may fail
to be reached. The main di®erence between Haller and Holden [27] and this work is
that while they focus on intra-group heterogeneity among the principals, we focus on
the agency problems in the delegation relationship. Crawford[11] formulatedthe idea
that commitment by bargainers in the presence of uncertainty can lead to bargaining
failures, but he abstracted away from the commitment instruments bargainers use.5
Hiring a delegate to bargain with the buyers is one of the trading mechanisms
used in real life (but not examined in the literature). In Section 1.4, we compare this
4 That strategic delegation causes distortions is not new. For example, in oligopolistic compe-
tition, Fershtman and Judd [17] show that strategic delegation leads to lower price, lower pro¯t
but greater social surplus if oligopolists compete in Cournot fashion but the opposite is true if they
compete in Bertrand fashion (see also Baye, Crocker and Ju [4], Vickers [59]).
5 Studying a variation of Crawford [11], Muthoo [48] shows that without uncertainty about costs
of revoking commitments, the bargaining outcome will be e±cient. In another related paper, Cai
[7] shows that the agency problems in the delegation relationship can cause bargaining ine±ciency.
Speci¯cally, in Cai's model, a delegate bargains with a third party under complete information but
faces reelection after the bargaining outcome becomes known to his constituency (principals). In
this case, delay in reaching agreements can be used by the delegate as a signal to his principals that
he is of \good type". In contrast to Cai [7], the agency problems in the delegation relationship do
not directly cause bargaining ine±ciency in our model. Rather, bargaining failures are caused by
the seller's strategic manipulation of the delegation contract that commits the delegate to bargain
aggressively.
7mechanism with another commonly studied mechanism: standard monopoly pricing,
whereby the seller commits to a ¯xed price (i.e., posted-price selling). Also in this
section we discuss some of the factors that a®ects whether and how the minimum
price can be credibly used as a commitment device to give the delegate bargaining
advantage.
To study inmore detailhow theoptimal mechanismrespondsto exogenouschanges
in the environment, in Section 1.5 we derive comparative statics of the model for the
case of uniform distributions and quadratic cost functions. We present and compare
results for three cases: no commitment e®ect, commitment e®ect with bargaining
e®ort, and commitment e®ect with marketing e®ort. For concreteness, Section 1.5
also gives some numerical examples where the model is explicitly computed. In one
seemingly reasonable con¯guration of parameter values, there is a 39% probability
that the delegate will not reach a deal with a buyer because of the seller's minimum
price policy, resulting in about welfare loss of 16% of the total social surplus. In this
case, the seller's expected payo® is more than 65% higher than that if she did not
take advantage of the strategic value of delegation contract.
Finally, Section 1.6 o®ers some concluding remarks.
Fershtman and Judd [18] is the ¯rst model that studies how optimal contracts
should respond to both agency problems and commitment considerations. Speci¯-
cally, they consider a double-sided delegation game in which two managers are hired
by their owners to compete with each other in an oligopolistic situation. In their
8model, like ours, delegation contracts are public information and not renegotiable.
Unlike in our model, there is only moral hazard problem in the delegation relationship
and the owners are more risk-averse than the managers are (so without commitment
considerations, the owners should sell the ¯rms to the managers). Fershtman and
Judd show that to take advantage of the commitment power of the delegation con-
tracts, the owners \over-compensate" the managers for success and thus bear more
risk than e±cient risk-sharing. In fact, the incentives for the managers are so strong
that an owner is better o® if her manager fails. Caillaud et al. [8] analyze a duopolis-
tic competition model with double sided delegation in the presence of both agency
problems and commitment. There is only adverse selection in their model (action
is contractible) and delegation contracts are renegotiable. Caillaud et al. show that
public but renegotiable delegation contracts still have commitment e®ects because
they impose restrictions on the possible renegotiation outcomes in the presence of
asymmetric information. The focus and analysis of their paper are quite di®erent
from ours.
1.2 The Basic Model Without Commitment E®ect
The model consists of three risk-neutral parties: a seller (P), a delegate (D), and a
buyer (B). The seller hires the delegate to sell a good to the buyer. The cost of the
good to the seller is normalized to be zero. The delegate's reservation utility is U0.
At the time the seller contracts with the delegate, the valuation of the buyer for the
9good is unknown to both the seller and her delegate. Their common belief about
the valuation is given by a probability distribution G(s) with an everywhere positive
density function g(s), where s 2 [s;¹ s] (0 · s < ¹ s) is the buyer's valuation.
For tractability, we suppose that when the delegate meets the buyer, the delegate
¯nds out the buyer's valuation. So they bargain over a price without any information
problem. The exact bargaining game will be speci¯ed later. For now, let us just
say that the delegate can get a share of r of the total surplus for the seller in the
equilibriumofthebargaininggame. Weassume that before bargainingwiththe buyer,
the delegate can exert e®orts to increase revenue for the seller. We consider two kinds
of e®ort. The ¯rst is \bargaining e®ort", which increases the delegate's share for any
¯xed surplus. In this case we write the delegate's share r as a function of his e®ort e;
and we assume that for all e, r(e) 2 (0;1), r0(e) > 0 and r00(e) · 0. Another type of
e®ort is \marketing e®ort", which increases the probability that the delegate ¯nds a
buyer. Conditional on ¯nding a buyer, the delegate will get a ¯xed share of r0. We
write the probability of ¯nding a buyer p as a function of the delegate's marketing
e®ort; and assume p(e) 2 (0;1), p0(e) > 0 and p00(e) · 0. For a ¯xed surplus s, the
expected price the delegate can get in the case of bargaining e®ort is x = r(e)s while
in the case of marketing e®ort is x = r0p(e)s, so there is no real di®erence in the
expected price between these two types of e®orts. Indeed, in this section we ignore
the commitment e®ect of delegationcontracts, the two cases are identical (and we will
use the bargaining e®ort interpretation). But in the next section, when commitment
10e®ect is present, the two cases will yield somewhat di®erent results.
The delegate incurs e®ort cost of C(e;t), where t is his \type" that characterizes
his disutility of e®ort. We make the following standard assumptions on C(e;t): (i)
C(e;t) is strictly increasing and convex ine, Ce = @C=@e > 0 and Cee = @2C=@e2 > 0;
and (ii) higher types have lower e®ort cost and lower marginal e®ort cost, that is,
Ct = @C=@t < 0 and Cet = @2C=@e@t < 0. The seller does not observe either the
e®ort or the type of the delegate. Therefore, there are both moral hazard and adverse
selection in the delegation relationship. At the time the seller is contracting with
the delegate, the seller knows that the delegate's type is drawn from a distribution
function F(t) with density function f(t) > 0 for every t 2 [t;¹ t], the domain of t.
Throughout this chapter, we make the following standard assumption on F(t):
Assumption 1 The distribution of types F(t) satis¯es the monotone hazard rate
property, that is, f(t)=[1 ¡ F(t)] is increasing in t.
This assumption is satis¯ed by common distributions, such as uniform or log-normal.
For simplicity, we also make the following technical assumptions:
Assumption 2 (i) Cet is a negative constant; (ii) r0(e) and p0(e) are positive con-
stants.
These two technical assumptions ensure that the agent's expected payo® function is
concave. The results presented here will not be a®ected if alternatively we make more
11general but less intuitive assumptions involving Ceet, Cett, r00 and p00. By Part (ii), we
will write r(e) = r0 + r0e and p(e) = p0 +p0e, where r0 and p0 are positive constants.
We assume that all the three players are risk-neutral. Suppose the total surplus
is s, and the delegate obtains x (i.e., the price is x) for the seller, and the seller pays
the delegate a wage of w. Then the seller's utility is UP = x¡ w, the delegate gets a
utility of UD = w ¡ C(e;t), and the buyer's utility is UB = s ¡ x.
The timing of the game is as follows. At date 0, the seller (she, henceforth) hires a
delegate (he, henceforth), whose type is unknown to her. She o®ers a menu contract
to him, which is observable and non-renegotiable. At date 1, the delegate decides
whether to continue the game or quit. If he stays in the game, then at date 2, he
chooses an e®ort level e. At date 3, the delegate meets the buyer, learns the buyer's
valuation of the good, and they bargain over a price. Finally, once a deal is reached,
the delegate gives the sale revenue to the seller, who then pays the delegate according
to their contract. Throughout the game, the seller can only observe the sale revenue.
This implicitly assumes that the delegate and the buyer cannot collude, otherwise it
would be easy for the buyer to hide some of the revenue. While collusion between the
delegate and the buyer is a real concern for the seller and is an interesting issue to
analyze, it is beyond the scope of this work and thus assumed away. In some cases,
reputation concerns of the delegate or legal constraints may help control collusive
behavior of the delegate.
Now we turn tothe speci¯cationof the bargaining game. The main results holdfor
12the standard alternating-o®er bargaining games such as Rubinstein [51] or Binmore,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky [5] and equivalently the cooperative solution concept Nash
Bargaining Solution.6 For concreteness, we adopt the bargaining game of Binmore,
et al. [5]: they alternate in making o®ers and there is a small exogenous probability
½d (respectively, ½b) that bargaining will break down whenever the delegate (respec-
tively, the buyer) rejects an o®er. When bargaining breaks down, the total surplus
disappears (e.g., out of his own control, one bargainer walks out of the room and
never returns). With this bargaining game, the e®ect of the delegate's bargaining
e®ort is to reduce ½d (that is, having better control over the bargaining process).
Bargaining could last in¯nite rounds if there is no agreement or breakdown. Suppose
the delegate moves ¯rst by making an o®er to the buyer.
When the delegate bargains with the buyer on behalf of the seller, how much the
delegate will get in equilibrium can be a®ected by the contract between the seller
and the delegate. Our main focus is precisely on how this commitment consideration
a®ects the design of the delegation contract. To make meaningful comparisons, in
this section, we ¯rst analyze the optimal contract design problem while ignoring the
commitment e®ect. So for now, we suppose that for some reason the buyer bargains
with the delegate as if the delegate were representing himself. This could happen
when the buyer does not know whether the delegate is representing himself or acting
6 See Osborne and Rubinstein [50] for discussions about the link between non-cooperative
alternating-o®er bargaining games and the Nash Bargaining Solution.
13as the agent for the seller.7
After meeting a buyer, suppose the delegate ¯nds out that the buyer's valuation
is s. The following lemma is a standard result from Binmore et al. [5]:
Lemma 1 When the delegate represents himself, the bargaining outcome in the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium is such that the delegate and the buyer reach an agreement
without delay and the sales price is x = rs, where r = ½b=[1¡ (1¡ ½b)(1¡ ½d)].
Since the equilibrium share of the delegate r decreases in ½d, it increases in his
bargaining e®ort e, which was assumed before. Alternatively, we could use the stan-
dard Rubinstein bargaining model, which would have r = (1¡±b)=(1¡±d±b), where ±d
and ±b are the discount factors of the delegate and the buyer respectively. Then the
e®ect of delegate's bargaining e®ort would be to increase ±d (i.e., improving patience).
Or, we could use the Nash Bargaining Solution and suppose the seller's relative bar-
gaining power is r while the buyer's is 1¡r, then maximizing rln(x)+(1¡r)ln(s¡x)
gives x = rs.
For future comparisons, let us consider ¯rst the case in which both the delegate's
e®ort and type are observable to the seller. For a delegate oftype t, the seller asks him
to exert e®ort e(t) and pays him a wage that covers his e®ort cost and his reservation
utility. So w(t) = C(e(t);t)+ U0. Then the seller's expected pro¯t is simply EUP =
R ¹ s
s [r(e)s ¡ w(t)]dG(s) = r(e)E(s) ¡ C(e;t) ¡ U0, where E(s) =
R ¹ s
s sdG(s). So the
7 Fershtman and Kalai [20] show that when the third party (here the buyer) either does not
know whether or not the delegate is representing himself or simply does not observe the details of
the contract, no commitment e®ect is still a trembling hand sequential equilibrium.
14optimal e®ort eFB(t) for the seller satis¯es the following condition:
r0E(s) = Ce(eFB(t);t) (1.1)
where subscripts are partial derivatives with respect to the corresponding variable
(that is, Ce = @C=@e). By our assumptions, the second-order condition is satis¯ed
and the solution to Equation (1.1) is unique. Also the optimal e®ort eFB(t) increases
in the delegate's type t. Note that since both the delegate's e®ort and type are
observable, there is no need to make wage contingent on sale revenue.
When the seller does not observe the delegate's e®ort and type, the optimal con-
tract design problem can be analyzed in the mechanism design framework. By the
revelation principle, it is without loss of generality to focus on direct revelation mech-
anisms in whichthe delegateis provided proper incentives toreveal his type truthfully
and behave obediently. In a direct revelation mechanism, a seller's mechanism con-
sists of a wage schedule w(^ t;x) that depends on the delegate's announced type ^ t and
the sale revenue x he eventually brings back, and a recommendation of e®ort level
e(^ t) that depends only on his announced type ^ t. Given the seller's mechanism, the
delegate of type t chooses an announcement of type ^ t and an e®ort level to maximize
his expected utility UD =
R ¹ s
s w(^ t;x)dG(s) ¡ C(e;t).
Formally, the seller's problem is to ¯nd a wage schedule w(^ t;x) and a recommen-








[x ¡ w(t;x)]dG(s)dF(t) (1.2)
15subject to
(i) (t;e(t)) 2 argmaxf^ t;eg UD =
R ¹ s
s w(^ t;x)dG(s) ¡ C(e;t)
(ii) UD(t) =
R ¹ s
s w(t;x)dG(s) ¡ C(e(t);t) ¸ U0, 8t
(iii) x = r(e(t))s, 8s
Condition (i) is the incentive compatible constraint for the delegate. It states that
he ¯nds it optimal to report his true type and to choose the recommended level of
e®ort. The interim participation constraint (condition (ii)) requires that the optimal
contract has to ensure the delegate at least his reservation utility. Finally, condition
(iii) describes the bargaining outcome for every possible buyer's valuation when the
commitment e®ect of delegation contract is ignored.
The mechanism design problem can be solved in two steps. In the ¯rst step, we
characterize the conditions for an optimal mechanism; and then in the second step
we ¯nd contracts that implement the optimal mechanism. The results of this section
and their derivation closely follow McAfee and McMillan [46] (see also La®ont and
Tirole [44]).
To characterize the conditions for an optimal mechanism, suppose the seller can
observe the delegate's e®ort but not his type and therefore can force upon him an
e®ort schedule e(^ t). Then the IC condition (i) is reduced to truth-telling only. Using
the Envelope Theorem and integration by parts, one can simplify the mechanism











dF(t) ¡ U0 (1.3)








The following proposition gives the (su±cient) conditions for an optimal mecha-
nism.
Proposition 1 If a wage contract w(^ t;x) can induce the delegate to (i) truthfully
reveal his type, and (ii) choose e¤(t), and guarantees him the reservation utility, then
the mechanism fw(^ t;x);e¤(t))g is optimal.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Comparing Equations (1.1) and (1.4), one can see that the optimal e®ort in the
presence of agency problems e¤(t) is lower than that under complete and perfect
information (eFB(t)) for all types but ¹ t. This is because the term Cet[1 ¡ F(t)]=f(t)
in Equation (1.4) is negative for all t < ¹ t. This term is the information rent to the
delegate. Because of asymmetric information between the seller and the delegate, the
economic cost of e®ort to the seller consists of the direct e®ort cost to the delegate
C(e;t) and the information rent. Equation (1.4) then simply says that marginal
bene¯t of e®ort equals marginal cost of e®ort. Since the information rent increases
the marginal cost of e®ort, the optimal level of e®ort should be lower.
The next step is to ¯nd contracts that satisfy all the conditions in Proposition 1.
Consider the following contract that is linear in sale revenue. If the delegate makes a
17sale, his wage is given by
w(^ t;x) = ®¤(^ t) +¯¤(^ t)x (1.5)
where ®¤(^ t) and ¯¤(^ t) are





¤(^ t)) + U0
¯¤(^ t) =
Ce(e¤(^ t); ^ t)
r0E(s)
;
and if the delegate fails to sell the good, his wage is simply w = ®¤(^ t). In other
words, ®¤(^ t) is an up-front payment made to the delegate when signing the contract
but before conducting the sale.
First we need to do a consistency check: such a linear contract should yield the
bargaining outcome as assumed in the mechanism design problem in Equation (1.2).
Lemma 2 With any linear contract of the form w(^ t;x) = ®(^ t)+¯(^ t)x where ®(^ t) is
an up-front payment, the bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
with the bargaining outcome being that the delegate and the buyer reach an agreement
without delay and the sales price is x = rs, where r = ½b=[1¡ (1¡ ½b)(1¡ ½d)].
Proof: By the standard result in the literature (Rubinstein [51], Binmore et al. [5],
Osborne and Rubinstein [50]), the bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in which the two bargainers will reach an agreement without delay. Let
x be the equilibrium price when the delegate makes an o®er and y be that when the
buyer makes an o®er. Then the standard argument in the literature implies that
s ¡ x = (1¡ ½b)(s ¡ y)
18® +¯y = (1¡ ½d)(® +¯x) +½d®
Solving these two equations gives the result of the Lemma. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 con¯rms that any linear contract (and hence the contract in Equation
(1.5)) is consistent with the no-commitment e®ect assumption made in this Section.
The idea is simple. The up-front payment ®(t) does not have any impact on the
bargaining process since it is sunk before the bargaining game. What matters for the
bargaining game is that the delegate gets w = ¯x if the agreed price is x. But the
bargaining outcome with this contract is the same as when the delegate is represent-
ing himself (in which case his utility is simply x), because a change of scale in the
delegate's utility does not a®ect his behavior. Therefore, the bargaining outcome is
x = r(e)s, 8s.
The next proposition states that this linear contract actually implements the op-
timal mechanism.
Proposition 2 The linear contract presented in Equation (1.5) implements the op-
timal recommended e®ort e¤(t) and induces truthful report of type.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition for the optimality of the linear contract is as follows. The seller
needs to provide incentives to the delegate for him to tell the truth and follow the
recommended e®ort. Because of risk-neutrality, these two tasks can be separately
accomplished by the linear contract: The slope of the linear contract in Equation
19(1.5) provides proper e®ort incentives while the constant takes care of truth-telling
about type.
A simple corollary can be derived from Proposition 2:
Corollary 1 In the optimal linear contract, the optimal e®ort e¤(t) and the sharing
term ¯¤(t) are non-decreasing in type, and the constant term ®¤(t) is non-increasing
in type.
Proof: See Appendix.
This corollary says that with the optimal linear contract, a more able delegate
(who dislikes e®ort less) is provided stronger incentives and hence works harder than
a less able one. In particular, it can be checked that the highest type delegate gets all
the residual sale revenue (¯¤(¹ t) = 1) and exerts the e±cient e®ort (e¤(¹ t) = eFB(¹ t)).
Since a more able delegate is rewarded a higher proportion of the sale proceeds, the
¯xed portion of his wage is smaller than that of a less able delegate. In fact, for
delegates of su±ciently high types, their ¯xed portion is negative. The interpretation
is that lower types opt for higher ¯xed wage and smaller commissions, while higher
types choose higher commissions and pay fees to get the job (such as franchise fees).
Since we assume away any commitment e®ect by the delegation contract in this
section, it does not make a di®erence whether the ¯xed portion of the wage contract
® is paid before or after the bargaining game. But for the purpose of comparison
with later sections, we suppose ® is paid up front when the delegate takes the job
(accept the contract) but before bargaining with the buyer.
201.3 Commitment E®ect Through Minimum Price
In the preceding section, we demonstrate that a linear delegation contract can imple-
ment the optimal mechanism for the seller IF delegation contracts have no commit-
ment e®ect. But as the delegation literature has demonstrated, in general what kind
of contracts the seller has for the delegate can a®ect the bargaining process between
the delegate and the buyer. Hence in designing the delegation contract, the seller
should take advantage of the contract's potential strategic value. In this section, we
study how this commitment e®ect in°uences the seller's contract choice and explore
its implications. Due to the complexity of the problem, we focus on contracts that
still keep some linear structures but impose minimum prices on the delegate. Mini-
mum prices seem to be commonly observed in practice (e.g., in car dealerships), and
our analysis attempts to shed light on their optimal uses in connection with opti-
mal delegation contracts. We analyze the case with \bargaining e®ort" and then the
\marketing e®ort" case.
1.3.1 Bargaining E®ort
The seller can do better by modifying the linear contract given in Equation (1.5) to
take advantage of the commitment e®ect. Consider the following contract. If the
delegate makes a deal, his wage is
w(^ t;x) = ®(^ t) + ¯(^ t)(x ¡z(^ t)); (1.6)
and if he does not sell the good, his wage is ®(^ t) (i.e., an up-front payment). Here z(^ t)
21is a minimum price that the seller wants the delegate to obtain. According to this
contract, the seller pays the delegate ®(^ t) once they sign the contract. The delegate
then goes to bargain with a buyer over a price. If the delegate brings back more
than z(^ t), then the seller pays him a commission ¯ of what the delegate obtains in
excess of the minimum price z(^ t). Otherwise, if the delegate brings back less than
z(^ t), then he has to pay back money to the seller in the amount of ¯(^ t)(z(^ t) ¡ x).8
If the delegate does not strike a deal with the buyer, he is paid zero (he still keeps
®(^ t) since it is paid before the negotiation). Remember we suppose that the seller
can observe whether there is a deal and the terms of the deal if it is made. So, for
example, the delegate is penalized if he sells the good for nothing (x = 0) but pays
no penalty if he reaches no deal. Note that the contract in Equation (1.5) is a special
case of the above contract with z = 0 for all ^ t.
If the delegate cannot get a price above the minimum price, then he will refuse
to make a deal and obtain a payo® of ®(^ t). So the delegate's choice not to make a
deal e®ectively changes the linear contract of Equation (1.6) into a convex contract.
It is this convexity that gives bargaining advantage to the delegate. Studying more
complex convex contracts is di±cult because the bargaining outcomes depend on the
speci¯c shapes of the delegate's payo® function.9
8 Any amount of penalty for a sale price below the minimum price will have the same e®ect. See
Lemma 3.
9 Haller and Holden [27] present a simple example showing that convexifying the delegate's
payo® function is always bene¯cial. They also o®er several explanations why such contracts are
not realistic. Long ago Sobel [55] pointed out that if bargainers were allowed to choose their payo®
functions among concave functions, choosing linear functions would be a dominant strategy.
22Assuming the contract is credible to the buyer, then it will a®ect the bargaining
between the delegate and the buyer. The bargaining outcome under this contract is
reported in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose the delegation contract is given by Equation (1.6). Then the
equilibrium outcome from the bargaining stage is x = r(e)(s¡z(^ t))+z(^ t), 8s ¸ z(^ t).
When s < z(^ t), there will be no agreement.
Proof: When s < z(^ t), there is no way the delegate can get a positive wage from a
deal at the same time the buyer is not worse o®, so there will be no agreement in this
case. Suppose s ¸ z(^ t). Again, standard arguments of bargaining theory imply that
there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Let x be the equilibrium price when
the delegate makes an o®er and y be that when the buyer makes an o®er. Then
s ¡ x = (1¡ ½b)(s ¡ y)
® + ¯(y ¡ z) = (1¡ ½d)[® +¯(x ¡z)] + ½d®
Solving these equations yields x = r(s¡z(^ t))+z(^ t), where r = ½b=[1¡(1¡½b)(1¡
½d)]. Q.E.D.
From Lemma 3, we can see that when s ¸ z(^ t), the seller gains an additional
amount of surplus (1 ¡ r(e))z(^ t) purely from the commitment e®ect. And this com-
mitment value is larger when the minimum price z is set higher, as long as it is not
too high to prevent a deal. The idea is simple. De¯ne ~ s = s¡z(^ t). The delegate has
to get at least z(^ t) for the seller in order to get paid. So the \real" surplus he and the
23buyer can bargain over is ~ s, of which the delegate should get r(e)~ s given their relative
bargaining power. Lemma 3 also points out the potential cost of using a minimum
price as a commitment device. That is, the seller may go over the board and set a
too high price target that prevents the delegate from reaching a deal with the buyer.
If the seller sets a minimum price z 2 [0;s], then for any possible s the delegate
and the buyer will reach a deal. Since commitment comes without cost for z 2 [0;s],
it seems that the seller should seek the maximum amount of commitment in this
range. This intuition is veri¯ed in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 For any z < s, the seller can get a greater expected payo® by increasing
the minimum price z. Therefore, the seller should set the minimum price not less
than s for every ^ t.
Proof: See Appendix.
Since the contract analyzed in the previous section corresponds to z = 0, Lemma
4 implies that the contract is not optimal for the seller when delegation contracts
have commitment power.
Now the central question is whether the seller wants to set a minimum price higher












(i) (t;e(t)) 2 argmaxf^ t;eg UD = ®(^ t)+ ¯(^ t)
R ¹ s
z(^ t)(x¡ z(^ t))dG(s) ¡ C(e;t)
24(ii) UD(t) ¸ U0, 8t
(iii) x = r(e(t))(s ¡ z(t))+ z(t), for s ¸ z(t), and 0 otherwise
(iv) z(t) 2 [s; ¹ s] for all t
As before, this problem canbe solvedin two steps. First we ¯nd the conditions for
the optimal e®ort eB(t) andminimum price zB(t), (where the superscript B stands for
\bargaining e®ort"). Following similar technical steps as in the proof of Proposition













where the argument (t) is suppressed in e and z, E[s ¡ zjs ¸ z] =
R ¹ s
z [s ¡ z]dG(s)
and z 2 [s; ¹ s].
By point-wise di®erentiation of Equation (1.8), and assuming interior solutions









(1 ¡ r(eB))(1 ¡ G(zB))¡ zBg(zB) = 0 (1.10)
From Equation (1.10), one can see that zB must be less than ¹ s, since @EUP=@z =
¡¹ sg(¹ s) < 0 at z = ¹ s.
To implement the optimal mechanism, the next step is to ¯nd the optimal ® and
¯ that induce the delegate to report his true type and then choose the desired level
of e®ort eB. Let ®B(^ t) and ¯B(^ t) in contract (1.6) be such that:




r0 r(eB(^ t))+ U0
¯B(^ t) =
Ce(eB(^ t);^ t)
r0E[s ¡ zB(^ t)js ¸ zB(^ t)]
(1.11)
The next proposition says that the contract (1.11) implements the optimal level
of e®ort eB(t).
Proposition 3 The linear contract (1.11) with the optimal minimum price zB(t)
implements the recommended e®ort eB(t) and induces the delegate to report his true
type.
If the seller's optimal minimum price turns out to be s, then the ¯rst-order con-
dition for the optimal e®ort, Equation (1.9), is reduced to




Denote this solution by ~ e(t).
Proposition 4 Suppose for some ~ t 2 (t; ¹ t], 1¡ r(~ e(~ t)) > sg(s). Then the seller will
set the optimal minimum price zB(t) above s for any delegate of type in [t;~ t]. As
a result, delegates of these types fail to reach agreement with the buyer with positive
probability. In particular, if ~ t ¸ ¹ t, then all delegates face a positive probability of
bargaining failure.
Proof: First note that ~ e(t) is non-decreasing in t. Since r is increasing in e, 1 ¡
r(~ e(t)) > sg(s) for any t 2 [t; ~ t]. Suppose that the seller chooses zB = s and ~ e(t) as
26in Equation (1.12) for some t 2 [t;~ t]. From the ¯rst-order condition (1.10), the seller
can increase her expected payo® by choosing a minimum price z > s. Contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 points out that the seller's strategic use of delegation contracts may
result in bargaining failures. Note that the condition in Proposition 4 is su±cient but
not necessary. To understand this condition, let us suppose that the buyer's valuation
s is uniformly distributed on [s; ¹ s]. If s = 0 or ¹ s is very large and 1 ¡ r is bounded
from below, then for any t 2 [t;¹ t], the seller sets a minimum price above s. Otherwise,
let r(~ e(~ t)) = k and the condition in Proposition 4 is equivalent to (1:5¡k)¢s > E(s)
where ¢s = ¹ s¡s and E(s) = (¹ s+s)=2. So Proposition 4 roughly says that when the
dispersion in the buyer's valuation is large relative to the expected gain from trade,
the seller is more likely to set a minimum price higher than the buyer's minimum
valuation. Intuitively, the more uncertain the seller is about the buyer's valuation,
the morelikely she wants to \over-commit"the delegateinorder to ensure a relatively
high price in most states of the world. On the other hand, if the expected valuation
is high relative to the dispersion of valuation, then the seller does not want to risk
losing potential pro¯table deals by over-committing the delegate. To see this last
point, consider the converse of Proposition 4. From Equation (1.10), it is clear that
if the valuation distribution satis¯es sg(s)=[1¡ G(s)] ¸ 1 for every s, then the seller
will always set zB = s. For uniformly distributed valuation, this condition simpli¯es
to 2s ¸ ¹ s, or E(s) ¸ 1:5¢s. So when the uncertainty about valuation is relatively
27small, the seller will set zB = s.
The next proposition shows the relationship between the optimal e®ort and min-
imum price.
Proposition 5 In the seller's optimal mechanism, the optimal e®ort level eB(t) is
non-decreasing in the delegate's type, and the optimal minimum price zB(t) is non-
increasing in the delegate's type. Therefore, higher type delegates are given more
chance of success in agreement and work harder than lower types.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The key to understanding Proposition 5 is that commitment through minimum
price and the delegate's e®ort are substitutes for the seller. An easy way to see
this is through the bargaining outcome equation x = r(e)(s ¡ z) + z. Clearly, the
marginal revenue of e®ort decreases in the minimum price z. More formally, one can
see from Equation (1.8) that the seller's expected payo® function EUP(e;¡z;t) is
supermodular in (e;¡z;t). By the monotone comparative statics (see Milgrom and
Shannon [47]), eB(t) and ¡zB(t) must be non-decreasing in t. Intuitively, Proposition
5 says that since it is relatively easier to induce a more able delegate to work hard
and get a goodprice, the seller will impose a smaller minimum price for him to reduce
the chance of no deal.
281.3.2 Marketing E®ort
Now we suppose that the delegate's e®ort is spent on marketing to attract or ¯nd a
buyer. The delegate ¯nds abuyer with probability p(e) 2 (0;1), where p(e) = p0+p0e.
For simplicity, the delegate's bargaining power relative to the buyer is assumed to be
¯xed and equals r0 2 (0;1).
We still focus on linear contracts with minimum prices as in Equation (1.6).
Clearly Lemma 3 from Section 1.3.1 applies here for a constant r0. But the seller
will get a positive price and pay the delegate a commission only when the delegate
¯nds a buyer. It is also easy to see that Lemma 4 holds for marketing e®ort as well,
that is, the seller will set a minimum price no less than s. Commitment with a mini-
mum price equal to s is costless tothe seller, so she should take advantage ofit. Again
the central question is whether the seller wants to set a minimum price above s. To















(i) (t;e(t)) 2 argmaxf^ t;eg UD = ®(^ t)+ p(e)¯(^ t)
R ¹ s
z(^ t)(x ¡ z(^ t))dG(s) ¡ C(e;t)
(ii) UD(t) ¸ U0, 8t
(iii) x = r0(s ¡ z)+ z, for s ¸ z, and 0 otherwise
(iv) z(t) 2 [s; ¹ s] for all t
Notice that the delegate's expected payo® is the same as in the case of bargaining
29e®ort with r(e) being replaced by r0p(e). The only di®erence with problem (1.7)
is how the delegate's e®ort a®ects the seller's expected payo®. Bargaining e®ort
increases only the share from the revenue net of the minimum price, while marketing
e®ort increases the probability of getting a certain amount of revenue including the
minimum price.
As before, this problem canbe solvedin two steps. First we ¯nd the conditions for
the optimal e®ort eM(t) and minimum price zM(t) (where M stands for \marketing").


















Let eM(t) and zM(t) be the level of e®ort and minimum price that solve this prob-
lem. We assume interior solution for zM. By point-wise di®erentiation of Equation


















(1¡ r0)(1 ¡ G(zM))¡ zMg(zM)
i
= 0 (1.16)
The second step is to ¯nd the contract coe±cients ®M and ¯M that satisfy the IC
and participation constraints and that implement the optimal e®ort eM. Let ®M(^ t)
and ¯M(^ t) in contract (1.6) be such that:
30®M(^ t) = C(eM(^ t);^ t)¡
R ^ t
t Ct(eM(º);º)dº ¡
Ce(eM(^ t); ^ t)
p0 p(eM(^ t)) + U0
¯M(^ t) =
Ce(eM(^ t);^ t)
r0p0E[s ¡ zM(^ t)js ¸ zM(^ t)]
(1.17)
The next proposition states that the contract (1.17) together with the minimum
price zM(t) induces the delegate to exert the recommended e®ort eM(t).
Proposition 6 The linear contract (1.17) with the optimal minimum price zM(t)
implements the recommended e®ort eM(t) and induces the delegate to report his true
type.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Comparing Equations (1.10) and (1.16), one can see that the ¯rst-order conditions
for the optimal minimum price are very similar in the two cases of bargaining and
marketing e®ort. The main di®erence is that in the case of marketing e®ort, the
minimum price can be solved from Equation (1.16) alone, and only depends on the
distribution of the buyers' valuations and the delegate's relative bargaining power but
not on the delegate's e®ort. The minimum price is also independent of the delegate's
type. Similar to Proposition 4, we have the following result:
Proposition 7 If 1 ¡ r0 > sg(s), then the seller will set a minimum price above s
for every delegate. Thus, with positive probability, the delegate and the buyer will not
make a deal.
This proposition says that, as in the case of bargaining e®ort, the seller's strategic
manipulation of the delegation contract may cause bargaining failures between the
31delegate and the buyer. It is easy to see that when the buyer's valuation is disperse
relative to the expected gains of trade, then the seller's optimal minimum price will
be more likely to exceed the buyer's lowest valuation.
Unlike in the case of bargaining e®ort, commitment through minimum prices and
incentives are no longer substitutes with marketing e®ort. In fact, since the minimum
price can be solved from Equation (1.16) alone, the minimum price and e®ort do not
display either substitute or complementary relations.
1.4 Discussions
1.4.1 Comparison with Other Trading Mechanisms
Hiring a delegate to bargain with consumers is one of the trading mechanisms used
in real life. Another commonly used mechanism is posted-price selling, whereby the







¿dG(s) = ¿[1¡ G(¿)]
So ¿ is given by
1¡ G(¿) = ¿g(¿) (1.18)
This is the standard monopoly pricing formula. Comparing it with Equations
(1.10) and (1.16), one ¯nds that the optimal posted price ¿ is greater than the min-
imum prices as long as the delegate's bargaining power (measured by his share r)
32is positive. And the di®erence between the optimal posted price ¿ and the optimal
minimum price increases in the delegate's bargaining power. When the delegate has
zero bargaining power (r = 0), then the minimum price coincides with the optimal
posted price. In this case, the delegate does not bring in additional sales revenue to
the seller. On the other hand, when the delegate's bargaining power is very large (r
approaches one), the optimal minimum price goes to s, and trade is almost e±cient.
In this case, the ¯nal sales price is close to the buyer's valuation. So the outcome
resembles a perfectly discriminating monopolist.
In general cases where the delegate has positive but not full bargaining power,
the trade outcome falls in between posted-price selling and perfectly discriminating
monopoly pricing. Perfectly discriminating monopoly pricing requires that the mo-
nopolist knows every buyer's valuation and can commit to a take-it-or-leave-it price
o®er to buyers. When the buyer's valuation is not observed, what we study is an
alternative to posted-price selling, namely, the seller hires a delegate to ¯nd out the
buyer's valuation and bargain over a price. This trading mechanism removes some of
the rigidity in posted-price selling, and thus the use of the delegate improves trade
e±ciency. Since the minimum price decreases in the delegate's bargaining power, the
e±ciency gain associated with the use of delegate increases in his bargaining power.
Of course, whether the seller gets more pro¯t by hiring the delegate relative to posted-
price selling also depends on the delegate's bargaining power, the cost of hiring him,
33and the distribution of the buyer's valuation.10
1.4.2 Commitment Power of Agency Contracts
A critical question in the delegation literature is whether and when a delegation
contract can be credibly used as a commitment device. Here we brie°y discuss some
of the factors that may a®ect the credibility of the contracts studied in the preceding
section as a commitment device.
Recall that the commitment e®ect in our model comes from the minimum price
only. As Lemma 3 shows, neither the ¯xed wage nor the commission rate of the
delegate's compensation contract a®ects the bargaining outcome. So the key to the
question of credibility is whether the buyer can be convinced that the minimum price
is indeed the limit of the delegate's discretion over price. How can the buyer be sure
that the delegate is not lying about the minimum price? What is to prevent the del-
egate and the seller from rescinding the minimum price, especially when the buyer's
valuation is just below it?
Not Perfectly Observable Contract. If the delegation contract is not perfectly ob-
servable to the buyer, the delegate may have a tendency to claim that a minimum
price close to the buyer's valuation is set by the seller. But this tendency may de-
stroy the credibility of using the minimum price as a commitment device. So whether
10 Wang [60] compares seller self-bargaining with posted-price selling in a di®erent model.
34unobservable delegation contracts have any commitment value in our model is not
clear. A thorough analysis would start by specifying the buyer's prior belief about
the minimum price (whether it is set, and how much it is) and then study the bar-
gaining game with such asymmetric information on the buyer's part. This is beyond
the scope of this work. But if we still assume that the delegate knows the buyer's
valuation, we can use the results from Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson [26] and Gul
and Sonnenschein [25] to show that under fairly reasonable conditions the minimum
prices can be revealed rather quickly in equilibrium, which implies that unobserv-
able minimum prices still have considerable commitment power. The main problem,
however, is that such bargaining models under asymmetric information often yield
multiple equilibria. Moreover, if the delegate does not perfectly know the buyer's
valuation, things become completely intractable.
As mentioned before, Katz [32], Fershtman and Kalai [20], Corts and Neher [10],
Kockesen and Ok [37], and many others have addressed the issue of whether unob-
servable contracts can still serve as a credible commitment device. Depending on the
other party's belief, these papers ¯nd that unobservable contracts can still have com-
mitment value when some equilibrium re¯nements are used. This suggests that our
results are valid to some extent even when minimum prices are not perfectly observed
by the buyers.
Renegotiable Delegation Contracts. A related credibility issue arises if the seller and
35thedelegatecanrenegotiatethedelegationcontract.11 Inourmodel, renegotiation can
be especially relevant when the delegate ¯nds out that the buyer's valuation is below
the minimum price. A Pareto improvement is readily available if the minimum price
in the delegate's compensation contract is lowered. But if renegotiation is possible in
such cases, then there is no strong reason why it cannot be in any other cases.
To maintain the credibility of the minimum price, the seller and the delegate may
rely on reputation e®ects (see discussions below) or other sorts of institutions. In the
case of car dealership, the dealer invoice price (and other related contractual provi-
sions between car manufactures and car dealers) can be thought of an institutional
innovation to maintain credibility with the help of car manufacturers.12
Reputation in Multi-Unit Sale. In situations such as car dealerships, the delegate is
hired to sell same products over time. Our model and our results extend easily to
the case in which there are N potential buyers with identical and independent dis-
tribution of valuations. On the credibility issue (which our model does not directly
address), repeated sales may make it easier for the seller and the delegate to commit
to a minimum price than a single-unit sale. When information about prices from
11 See, e.g., Dewatripont [13] and Caillaud et al. [8] for analysis of commitment e®ect when
delegation contracts are renegotiable.
12 Alternatively, car manufactures would simply sell cars tocar dealerships at lower prices. It seems
di±cult to justify going through all the troubles of those contractual provisions (e.g., holdbacks and
other incentives) if not for commitment purposes. Contracts between car makers and dealers are
franchise contracts, and there are many other important considerations (e.g., competition among
dealers), see, e.g., Klein and Murphy [36], Klein [35] and Tirole [57]. See also Bresnahan and Reiss
[6] for an early empirical work on pricing practices between car manufacturers and dealers.
36past trades is available to later buyers (e.g., through word of mouth communication
or consumer reports), the delegate and the seller may have incentives to stick to the
minimum price despite short-term gains from trading with low-valuation buyers.
Reputation with Multiple Delegates. Similar reputation e®ects can arise when the
seller hires multiple delegates to conduct sales (e.g., one person owns several dealer-
ships, each of which is run by a manager). If the seller renegotiates with one manager,
then it is hard not to renegotiate with other managers, which can reduce the total
pro¯t for the seller.
1.5 Comparative Statics and Numerical Examples
In this section we want to derive comparative statics of the model that may be useful
in certain applications. In doing so, we needtospecify themodel alittle more further.
Speci¯cally, suppose the buyer's valuation is uniformly distributed in [s; ¹ s] and the
delegate's type is uniformly distributed in [t;¹ t]. The revenue share the delegate can
get is given by r(e) = r0 + r0e in the case of bargaining e®ort. The parameter r0 is
the share the delegate can get without extra unobservable e®ort, and the parameter
r0 measures how productive the delegate's bargaining e®ort is (marginal revenue of
e®ort equals r0E(s)). To ensure r(e) · 1, the meaningful range for bargaining e®ort
is constrained to [0;(1 ¡ r0)=r0]. On the other hand, in the case of marketing e®ort,
the revenue share the delegate can get is a constant r0, and the probability of ¯nding
37a buyer is p(e) = p0 + p0e. In this case, the e®ort is constrained to e · (1 ¡ p0)=p0
to ensure that p(e) · 1. The delegate's cost function is: C(e;t) = °1(¹ t¡ t)e + °2e2,
with °1 and °2 both positive constants. Finally, we let U0 = 0.
For concreteness, wewill solve the model numerically with the following parameter
values. The buyer's valuation is uniform on [10;950], and the delegate's type is
uniform on [0;1]. In the bargaining e®ort case, the delegate's bargaining share is
r(e) = 0:3 + 0:1e, and e 2 [0;7]. In the marketing e®ort case, the bargaining share
is r0 = 0:5. The probability function is p(e) = 0:3 +0:1e, and e 2 [0;7]. Under both
interpretations, the e®ort cost function is C(e;t) = 8(1¡t)e+12e2. In this case, the
total expected surplus from trade is 480.
1.5.1 No Commitment E®ect
If delegation contracts do not have any commitment e®ect, our analysis in Section
1.2 shows that the seller's optimal e®ort schedule should maximize
(r0 +r
0e)E(s)¡ 2°1(¹ t¡ t)e¡ °2e
2
where E(s) = (¹ s + s)=2. From Equations (1.4) and (1.5), the seller's desired level of








¯¤ = 1 ¡
°1(¹ t¡ t)
r0E(s)
38The solution to our numerical model is given in Table 1.4.13 In this case, since
the delegate and the buyer will always make a deal, the total expected surplus from
trade is 480, which is shared by the seller, the delegate and the buyer. The seller
obtains an expected surplus of 169.6, and the buyer gets an expected surplus of 256.
The remainder is the delegate's expected wage payment of 54.4, of which 40 is his
expected e®ort cost and 14.4 his expected information rent.
The comparative statics are straightforward and are summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Comparative Statics: No Commitment
Increase in t ¹ t r0 E(s) °1 °2
e¤ " # " " # #
¯¤ " # " " # ¡
These results are easy to understand. Since higher type delegates have lower
marginal e®ort costs, optimal e®ort (and hence incentives through commission rate)
should increase in type. The marginal revenue of e®ort is the product of r0 and the
expected total surplus E(s). Hence, holding other things ¯xed, increase in r0 or the
expected total surplus will lead to higher commission rates and greater e®ort. The
parameter r0 measures the importance of e®ort. When r0 = 0, the moral hazard
problem disappears. In this case, ¯¤ = 0 and e¤ = 0, and the seller pays the delegate
a ¯xed wage equal to his reservation utility. On the other hand, the parameter °2
13 The detailed solutions to the numerical model are presented in several Tables at the end of the
chapter.
39measures the di±culty ofinducinghigh e®ort for any given type ofdelegate, hencehas
the opposite e®ect on the optimal e®ort as r0. The commission rate ¯¤ is independent
of °2 because the \physical" e®ort cost °2e2 is compensated by the ¯xed payment ®¤.
Holding other things ¯xed, increase in ¹ t means that the degree of adverse selection
is greater between the seller and the delegate and hence makes it harder to induce
truth-telling from the delegate. Consequently, ceteris paribus, the higher ¹ t, the lower
the optimal e®ort and commissionrate. To see this more clearly, consider the extreme
case in which ¹ t collapses to t so that there is no adverse selection. Then t = ¹ t = t,
so ¯¤ = 1 and e¤ = r0E(s)=(2°2) = eFB. This is simply the standard result that the
e±cient outcome (for the seller) can be achieved with a sell out contract when there
is moral hazard and the agent is risk-neutral.
The parameter °1 measures the intensity of agency problem between the seller
and the delegate. Higher °1 means that di®erent delegates di®er more in their dislike
of e®ort, which leads to higher information rents. Consequently, other things being
equal, the seller would want to set a higher commission rate and induce greater e®ort
from the delegate when°1 is lower. When °1 = 0, the delegate's type does not matter,
and the seller should sell the good to the delegate.
1.5.2 Bargaining E®ort
Now suppose delegation contracts have commitment power and the delegate exerts
bargaining e®ort. From Section 1.3.1, for every type t, the seller's desired e®ort and
40minimum price should maximize
UP;t = (r0 +r0e)
(¹ s ¡ z)2
2¢s
+z
¹ s ¡ z
¢s











¡ 2°1(¹ t¡ t)e ¡ °2e2
We write ¹ s = E(s) + ¢s=2, where ¢s = ¹ s ¡ s, because we would like to separate
out the e®ects of changes in the expected surplus and changes in the uncertainty
(dispersion) of valuations.
The closed form solutions for the optimal e®ort and minimum price are not readily
available from the ¯rst-order conditions (which lead to cubic equations of e and z).
Table 1.5 gives the solution for our numerical example. In this case, the optimal e®ort
is much lower than the case with no commitment. Moreover, the optimal minimum
price is set in between [365;390]. This implies that the chance of bargaining failure is
about 39 %. Because of the commitment e®ect, the seller's expected payo® jumps to
281.33, more than 65 % higher than that in the case of no commitment e®ect. The
delegate's e®ort cost and information rent are both much lower. The buyer is also
screwed, getting an expected payo® of 115, which is less than half of that in the case
of no commitment. Bargaining failures cause welfare loss of about 76, about 16 % of
the total expected surplus.
We derive comparative statics results for the case of bargaining e®ort (details in
the Appendix), which are summarized in Table 1.2 below.
The comparative statics of eB and ¯B with respect to ft;¹ t;r0;E(s);°1;°2g are the
same as in the case with no commitment e®ect, and have the same interpretations as
41Table 1.2: Comparative Statics: Bargaining E®ort
Increase in t ¹ t r0 E(s) ¢s °1 °2
eB " # " " # # #
zB # " # "/# " " "
¯B " # " " # # #
The cells with two arrows indicate ambiguous comparative statics.
given in the previous subsection.
A new implication from commitment e®ect is that now the delegate's optimal
e®ort and his incentives (measured by ¯B) are lower if uncertainty about the buyer's
valuationincreases (i.e., ¢s increases while holding E(s) ¯xed). Without commitment
e®ect, uncertainty about the buyer's valuation does not matter because both the seller
and the delegate are risk-neutral. With commitment e®ect, the seller sets a minimum
price zB that can be higher than the buyer's lowest valuation. When E(s) is ¯xed and
the dispersion of valuation ¢s increases, the buyer's lowest valuation must decrease.
It follows that more likely the buyer's valuation falls below a ¯xed minimum price.
Moreover, the optimal minimum price will increase in this case (see below). Thus,
the probability of bargaining failure increases. As a result, the expected return to
bargaining e®ort is reduced, thus leading to lower e®ort and lower incentives.
Another set of comparative statics results in Table 1.2 concerns the minimum
price. In Section 1.3.1 we show that incentives and minimum prices are substitutes
(Proposition 5) and they move in opposite directions as the delegate's type changes.
42In fact, this is also true with respect to ¹ t, r0, °1 and °2 (see the Appendix). Basically,
when agency problems are more severe and hence it is more costly to induce e®orts
(higher ¹ t, °1 and °2), then the seller will substitute incentives for commitment by
increasing the minimum price. On the other hand, when e®ort is more productive
(higher r0), then the seller will reduce the minimum price. Whenthe expected surplus
E(s) increases (holding ¢s ¯xed), there are two opposite e®ects on the minimum
price. On one hand, e®ort is more productive, hence the minimum price should go
down. On the other hand, since both s and ¹ s increase, the cost of commitment (i.e.,
no deal) decreases while the bene¯t of commitment increases, so the minimum price
should go up. The net e®ect of E(s) on z is thus ambiguous. For example, if e®ort is
not very productive (low r0) or is costly (high °2) or uncertainty about valuation ¢s
is relatively high, then the second e®ect dominates so the minimum price increases
in E(s). When the dispersion of valuation ¢s increases (holding E(s) ¯xed), the
marginal cost of using minimum prices becomes relatively smaller than the marginal
bene¯t. Therefore, minimum price increases in ¢s. Moreover, e®ort will go down,
also leading to higher minimum price.
1.5.3 Marketing E®ort
Now we turn to the case of marketing e®ort. From Section 1.3.2, for every type t, the
seller's desired e®ort and minimum price should maximize












¡ 2°1(¹ t¡ t)e ¡ °2e
2
43It is easy to check that the optimal e®ort, the minimum price and the slope of the





















2°1(¹ t¡ t)(2¡ r0)2¢s
r0p0[E(s)+ ¢s
2 ]2
The solution to our numerical exampleis presentedinTables 1.6 (no commitment)
and 1.7 (commitment).
Unlike the bargaining e®ort case, now the optimal e®ort is higher with commit-
ment thanwithout commitment, that is, incentives andcommitment are complements
in this example. Consequently, the probability of ¯nding a buyer is higher with com-
mitment, and the commission rate is much higher (greater than 2), which resembles
the results in Fershtman and Judd [18, 17] that managers are \over-compensated"
on the margin in equilibrium. The seller imposes a minimum price of 316, resulting
in a 33% chance of bargaining failure. The welfare loss from bargaining failures is
about 11% if holding e®ort ¯xed, about 3% if compared to the case under no com-
mitment. The seller's expected utility increases from 74 to 103 (around 40%) due
to both the commitment and incentive e®ects. The buyer is again the victim of the
seller's commitment scheme, seeing his expected utility plunge from 88 to 43.
The comparative statics are summarized in Table 1.3.
The comparative statics of e®ort eM and commission rate ¯M are basically the
same as in the case of bargaining e®ort. The minimum price now is independent of all
44Table 1.3: Comparative Statics: Marketing E®ort
Increase in t ¹ t p0 E(s) ¢s °1 °2
eM " # " " # # #
zM ¡ ¡ ¡ " " ¡ ¡
¯M " # " " # # ¡
the variables except the buyer's valuations (and the delegate's bargaining power r0).
Furthermore, the minimum price and e®ort are positively related when the expected
valuation changes, but negatively related when the dispersion of valuation increases.
1.6 Conclusion
We develop a framework that can be used to analyze the interactions between agency
problems and commitment e®ect in delegated bargaining situations. We ¯nd that
the seller's strategic manipulation of the delegation contracts can cause bargaining
failures between her delegate and the buyer. Furthermore, the interactions between
incentives and commitment depend on the nature of the agency problem: they are
substitutes in the case of bargaining e®ort but not in the case of marketing e®ort.
We also derive comparative statics of the model, some of which may possibly lead to
testable implications. Empirical work is badly needed for the delegation literature,
because, to our best knowledge, there has been no empirical study providing evidence
on the existence of strategic delegation despite a large number of theoretical works.
451.7 Appendix to Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 1: Let EUP be the seller's expected utility when she pays








r(e)E(s) ¡ E[w(^ t;x)]
ª
dF(t) (1.19)
and let UD(^ t;t) be the type-t delegate's utility when he announces type ^ t, which is
UD(^ t;t) = E[w(^ t;x)] ¡ C(e;t) (1.20)
where the expectation E[:] in these two equations is taken over the random variable
s.
Consider a seller's e®ort recommendation e(^ t). Suppose the delegate follows it.
The IC condition reduces to truth-telling only. The ¯rst-order condition with respect
to the delegate's type announcement is
@UD(^ t;t)
@^ t
j^ t=t = 0
Let UD(t) = UD(t;t) be the delegate's utility when he reports his true type. The
total derivative of UD(t) with respect to his type report can be obtained from the












j^ t=t = ¡Ct(e;t)
where the last equality comes from Equation (1.20). Since this is a total derivative






So, from Equations (1.20) (evaluated at the delegate's true type) and (1.21) we
can solve for the wage schedule as follows















dF(t) ¡ UD(t) (1.22)




























Note that if the seller ensures a type-t delegate a utility UD(t) = U0, the interim
participation constraint is satis¯ed for all types. The reason is that the delegate's
expected utility function (Equation (1.21)) is increasing in t since Ct is negative.
Hence the seller should set UD(t) = U0.










This is Equation (1.3). Note that the seller has to pay the delegate his e®ort cost,
his reservation utility and some information rent. The seller will choose an e®ort
recommendation that maximizes her expected payo®. Di®erentiating point-wise with







This is Equation (1.4). The second-order condition is clearly satis¯ed because the
integrand in Equation (1.3) is concave in e: r0 is a constant, Cee(:;t) > 0, and Cet is
a constant. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Forlater reference, notice that e®orte¤(t)isnon-decreasing
in type. From Equation (1.4), it is clear that the \total" marginal cost of e®ort
decreases with type (the inverse of the hazard rate decreases with type and Cet is
negative). By the monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon [47]), e®ort
must be non-decreasing in t.
If the seller o®ers the delegate the contract (1.5), the delegate's utility when he
exerts e®ort e and reports ^ t is
UD(^ t;e;t) = C(e¤(^ t);^ t)+
Ce(e¤(^ t);^ t)





¤(º);º)dº ¡ C(e;t)+ U0 (1.24)













¤(^ t);^ t) = 0
They are satis¯ed at ^ t = t and e = e¤(t). The second-order conditions for a
maximum are also satis¯ed since the delegate's pro¯t is concave in e®ort and the
























] ¸ 0 (1.25)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: That ¯¤(t) is non-decreasing in type can be checked from
Equation (1.25). In the beginning of the proof of Proposition 2 we showed that the











Proof of Lemma 4: Consider any direct revelation mechanism (®(^ t), ¯(^ t), z(^ t),
e(^ t)), where z(^ t) < s. This mechanism gives the seller a revenue of r(e(t))[E(s) ¡
z(t)] + z(t). But the seller can do better with another mechanism which also im-
plement the same e®ort recommendation e(^ t) but imposes the minimum price equal
to s. Consider the following mechanism (~ ®(^ t), ¯(^ t), s, e(^ t)), where ~ ®(^ t) = ®(^ t) +
¯(^ t)r(e(^ t))(s ¡ z(^ t)). The expected wage is the same since
E[w(x;^ t)] = ~ ®(^ t) + ¯(^ t)E[x¡ s] =
48= ~ ®(^ t) + ¯(^ t)r(e(^ t))[E(s) ¡ s] =
= ®(^ t) + ¯(^ t)r(e(^ t))(s ¡ z(^ t)) + ¯(^ t)r(e(^ t))[E(s) ¡ s] =
= ®(^ t) + ¯(^ t)r(e(^ t))[E(s) ¡ z(^ t)]
All the (IC) and(IR) conditions must be satis¯ed as they are in the old mechanism
(®(^ t), ¯(^ t), z(^ t), e(^ t)). The cost to theseller is also the same, buther expectedrevenue
increases since
E(x) = r(e(t))E[s ¡ s] + s = r(e(t))E(s)+ [1¡ r(e(t))]s >
> r(e(t))E(s) + [1¡ r(e(t))]z(t) = r(e(t))[E(s)¡ z(t)] + z(t)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: The type-t delegate's utility when he reports ^ t, chooses e
and is paid according to contract (1.11) is
UD(^ t; e; t) = ®B(^ t)+¯B(^ t)r(e)E[s¡zB(^ t)js ¸zB(^ t)] ¡C(e;t)
= C(eB(^ t);^ t) +
Ce(eB(^ t); ^ t)
r0 [r(e) ¡r(eB(^ t))] ¡
Z ^ t
t
Ct(eB(º);º)dº ¡C(e; t) +U0
Notice the similarity betweenthis utility and that of Equation (1.24). The proof is
similar to that of Proposition 2 with a change of the superscript \¤" to the superscript
\B" and a change of E(s) to E[s ¡ z(^ t)js ¸ z(^ t)]. The second-order condition is
satis¯ed because Ce(eB(t);t) is non-decreasing in type. From Equation (1.9),
d
dt


















Proposition 5 shows that z is non-increasing in type. Hence the ¯rst term of the
equality is non-negative. From Equation (1.25), the second term is also non-negative.
Q.E.D.
49Proof of Proposition 5: From the seller's expected payo® function in Equation
(1.8), we can show that
@2EUP
@e@(¡z)
= r0@E[s ¡zjs ¸ z]
@(¡z)















Therefore, EUP(e;¡z;t) is supermodular, and by the monotone comparative sta-
tics, e(t) is non-decreasing in t and z is non-increasing in t. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: Recall that p(e) in Section 1.3.2 has the same interpre-
tation as r(e) in Sections 1.2 and 1.3.1. The delegate's utility under contract (1.17)
is
UD(^ t; e; t) = ®M(^ t) +¯M(^ t)r0p(e)E[s¡zM(^ t)js ¸zM(^ t)] ¡C(e;t) =
= C(eM(^ t);^ t) +
Ce(eM(^ t); ^ t)




Next compare the delegate's utility under this contract with his utility in the
proof of Proposition 2 (see Equation (1.24)). The rest of the proof is similar to that
of Proposition 2 with a change of the superscript \¤" to the superscript \M". The
second-order condition is satis¯ed because Ce(eM(t);t) is non-decreasing with type.













Comparative statics: Bargaining E®ort (Table 1.2): The seller's utility for a
given type t, assuming that the parameters are such that zB 2 (s; ¹ s), is










¡ 2°1(¹ t¡ t)e¡ °2e2
50This function, written as UP;t(e;¡z;t;¡¹ t;r0;¡°1;¡°2), is supermodular since
@2EUP;t
@e@z








































By the monotone comparative statics, e and ¡z are non-decreasing in t and r0 and
non-increasing in ¹ t, °1 and °2.
The equation for the commission ¯B is given by
¯
B = 1¡
2°1(¹ t¡ t)(2¡ r0 ¡ r0e)2¢s
r0[E(s)+ ¢s
2 ]2 (1.26)
This commission increases in t and r0, and decreases in ¹ t, °1 and °2.
The response of e®ort and minimum price to changes in E(s) and ¢s is not
straightforward, but we can get some results from the ¯rst-order conditions. Com-
bining those two conditions ((1.9) and (1.10)) we obtain the following equations (they
are displayed in Figures 1.1 and 1.2):
r0[E(s) + ¢s
2 ]2
2¢s(2 ¡ r0¡ r0e)2 = 2°1(¹ t¡ t)+ 2°2e (1.27)
z =
"














We can see that the left-hand side of Equation (1.27) increases in E(s) for every
e®ort level. Hence, eB increases in E(s). On the other hand, the change in the
right-hand side of Equation (1.28) is undetermined since
@RHS
@E(s)









This is so because two opposite forces work here: e®ort increases in E(s) (mini-
mum price should decrease), and the net bene¯t of commitment increases (minimum
price should increase). So we cannot say much more unless we put some additional
restrictions on parameters.
51From condition (1.10) we can show that z = [E(s) + ¢s=2](1¡ r(e))=(2 ¡ r(e)).
Hence, [E(s)+¢s=2¡z] = [E(s)+¢s=2]=(2¡r(e)). Taking into account that e®ort
increases in E(s), this term also increases in E(s). Therefore ¯B increases in E(s).









2(2 ¡ r0¡ r0e)2¢s2 =
¡r0¹ ss
2(2 ¡ r0¡ r0e)2¢s2 < 0
Hence, eB decreases, and (1 ¡ r(e))=(2 ¡ r(e)) increases, in ¢s. This last e®ect
together with the initial increase in ¢s implies that the minimum price increases.
The second term of the equation for ¯B (1.26) is inversely proportional to the
left-hand side of equation (1.27), so it increases in ¢s. Moreover, e®ort decreases in
¢s, which causes ¯B to decrease in ¢s. Q.E.D.
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54Table 1.4: A Numerical Example of Bargaining E®ort (No Commitment, z = 0)
t  e*  r(e*)  b b(e*)  EUP  EUD  C(e*)  EUB 
0  1.33  0.43  0.833  176.0  0.0  32.0  272.0 
0.1  1.40  0.44  0.850  175.4  2.2  33.6  268.8 
0.2  1.47  0.45  0.867  174.5  4.7  35.2  265.6 
0.3  1.53  0.45  0.883  173.4  7.4  36.8  262.4 
0.4  1.60  0.46  0.900  172.2  10.2  38.4  259.2 
0.5  1.67  0.47  0.917  170.7  13.3  40.0  256.0 
0.6  1.73  0.47  0.933  169.0  16.6  41.6  252.8 
0.7  1.80  0.48  0.950  167.0  20.2  43.2  249.6 
0.8  1.87  0.49  0.967  164.9  23.9  44.8  246.4 
0.9  1.93  0.49  0.983  162.6  27.8  46.4  243.2 
1  2.00  0.50  1.000  160.0  32.0  48.0  240.0 
Ex-ante               
Value  1.67  0.47  0.917  169.6  14.4  40.0  256.0 
 
Basic Information: ¹ s = 950, s = 10, E(s) = 480, ¢s = 940, °1 = 8, °2 = 12, r0 = 0:1, r0 = 0:3,
UD(t) = 0.
Revenue Function: r(e) = r0 + r0e, Cost Function: C(e;t) = °1(1 ¡ t)e + °2e2.
Notation: t: type; e¤: e®ort; r(e¤): bargaining share; ¯(e¤): commission; EUP: seller's utility;
EUD: delegate's utility; C(e¤): e®ort cost; EUB: buyer's utility.




B  b b
B  EUP  EUD  C(e
B)  EUB  Surplus  Welfare 
                  (*)  Loss (**) 
0  0.03  0.303  390.3  0.520  282.6  0.0  0.2  116.2  399.0  81.0 
0.1  0.10  0.310  387.9  0.572  283.1  0.2  0.8  116.0  400.0  80.0 
0.2  0.17  0.317  385.4  0.623  283.3  0.6  1.5  115.7  401.0  79.0 
0.3  0.25  0.325  383.0  0.673  283.2  1.2  2.1  115.5  402.0  78.0 
0.4  0.32  0.332  380.5  0.722  283.0  2.0  2.8  115.3  403.0  77.0 
0.5  0.39  0.339  378.0  0.770  282.5  3.1  3.4  115.0  404.1  75.9 
0.6  0.46  0.346  375.5  0.818  281.8  4.5  4.1  114.7  405.1  74.9 
0.7  0.54  0.354  372.9  0.865  280.8  6.0  4.8  114.5  406.1  73.9 
0.8  0.61  0.361  370.3  0.910  279.6  7.8  5.5  114.2  407.1  72.9 
0.9  0.68  0.368  367.7  0.956  278.2  9.9  6.2  113.9  408.1  71.9 
1  0.76  0.376  365.1  1.000  276.5  12.1  6.9  113.6  409.2  70.8 
Ex-ante                     
Value  0.39  0.339  377.9  0.766  281.3  4.3  3.5  115.0  404.1  75.9 
                      Probability of bargaining failure      39.1%       
Increase in Seller's Utility with respect to no commitment  65.9%       
Welfare Loss/Expected Surplus      15.8%       
 
Basic Information: ¹ s = 950, s = 10, E(s) = 480, ¢s = 940, °1 = 8, °2 = 12, r0 = 0:1, r0 = 0:3,
UD(t) = 0.
Revenue Function: r(e) = r0 + r0e, Cost Function: C(e;t) = °1(1 ¡ t)e + °2e2.
Notation: t: type; eB: e®ort; r(eB): bargaining share; zB: minimum price; ¯(eB): commission;
EUP: seller's utility; EUD: delegate's utility; C(eB): e®ort cost; EUB: buyer's utility.
(¤) Surplus is the sum of the delegate's cost and the seller, delegate and buyer's utility.
(¤¤) Welfare loss is equal to Expected Surplus (480) minus Surplus. It can also be computed as the
expected surplus between s and z.
56Table 1.6: A Numerical Example of Marketing E®ort (No Commitment, z = 0)
t  e*  p(e*)  b( b(e*)  EUP  EUD  C(e*)  EUB  Surplus (+) 
0 0.33  0.333  0.667  76.0 0.0  4.0  80.0  160.0 
0.1 0.40  0.340  0.700  76.2 0.6  4.8  81.6  163.2 
0.2 0.47  0.347  0.733  76.1 1.5  5.6  83.2  166.4 
0.3 0.53  0.353  0.767  75.8 2.6  6.4  84.8  169.6 
0.4 0.60  0.360  0.800  75.4 3.8  7.2  86.4  172.8 
0.5 0.67  0.367  0.833  74.7 5.3  8.0  88.0  176.0 
0.6 0.73  0.373  0.867  73.8 7.0  8.8  89.6  179.2 
0.7 0.80  0.380  0.900  72.6 9.0  9.6  91.2  182.4 
0.8 0.87  0.387  0.933  71.3 11.1  10.4  92.8  185.6 
0.9 0.93  0.393  0.967  69.8 13.4  11.2  94.4  188.8 
1 1.00  0.400  1.000  68.0 16.0  12.0  96.0  192.0 
Ex-ante               
Value  0.67 0.367 0.833  73.6 6.4  8.0  88.0  176.0 
 
Basic Information: ¹ s = 950, s = 10, E(s) = 480, ¢s = 940, °1 = 8, °2 = 12, p0 = 0:1, p0 = 0:3,
r0 = 0:5, UD(t) = 0.
Probability Function: p(e) = p0 + p0e, Cost Function: C(e;t) = °1(1 ¡ t)e + °2e2.
Columns 2 and 4 are computed as those in Table 1.4, but replacing r0p0 for r0.
Notation: t: type; e¤: e®ort; r(e¤): bargaining share; ¯(e¤): commission; EUP: seller's utility;
EUD: delegate's utility; C(e¤): e®ort cost; EUB: buyer's utility.
(+) Surplus is the sum of the delegate's cost and the seller, delegate and buyer's utility. The ex ante
revenue in Expected Utilities and Surplus is the corresponding revenue times the probability of the
delegate ¯nding a buyer.





M  b b
M 
EUP  EUD  C(e
M)  EUB  Surplus  p(e
M)E(s)   Loss from   Welfare Loss v. 
                    (*)    failure(**)  No commit- 
ment (***) 
  0  0.67  0.367   316.7  2.250   106.7  0.0   10.7  39.1  156.5   176.0  19.5 3.5  
  0.1   0.73  0.373   316.7  2.325   106.6  1.2   11.7  39.8  159.3   179.2  19.9 3.9  
  0.2   0.80  0.380   316.7  2.400   106.3  2.6   12.8   40.5  162.2   182.4  20.2 4.2  
  0.3   0.87  0.387   316.7  2.475   105.7  4.2   13.9  41.3  165.0   185.6  20.6 4.6  
  0.4   0.93  0.393   316.7  2.550   105.0  6.0   14.9  42.0  167.8   188.8  21.0 5.0  
  0.5   1.00  0.400   316.7  2.625   104.0  8.0   16.0  42.7  170.7   192.0  21.3 5.3  
  0.6   1.07  0.407   316.7  2.700   102.8  10.2  17.1  43.4  173.5   195.2  21.7 5.7  
  0.7   1.13  0.413   316.7  2.775   101.5  12.7  18.1  44.1  176.4   198.4  22.0 6.0  
  0.8   1.20  0.420   316.7  2.850   99.9  15.4  19.2  44.8  179.2   201.6  22.4 6.4  
  0.9   1.27  0.427   316.7  2.925   98.0  18.2  20.3  45.5  182.1   204.8  22.7 6.7 
  1  1.33  0.433   316.7  3.000   96.0  21.3  21.3  46.2  184.9   208.0  23.1 7.1  
Ex-ante                       
Value  1.00  0.400   316.7  2.625   102.9  9.1   16.0  42.7  170.7   192.0  21.3 5.3  
                           
Probability of bargaining failure  32.6%           
Loss from bargaining failure (**)  11.1%           
Increase in Seller's Utility with respect to no commitment  39.9%           
Welfare Loss/Expected Surplus  3.0%           
 
Basic Information: ¹ s = 950, s = 10, E(s) = 480, ¢s = 940, °1 = 8, °2 = 12, p0 = 0:1, p0 = 0:3,
r0 = 0:5, UD(t) = 0.
Probability Function: p(e) = p0 + p0e, Cost Function: C(e;t) = °1(1 ¡ t)e + °2e2.
Notation: t: type; eM: e®ort; p(eM): probability of ¯nding a buyer; zM: minimum price; ¯(eM):
commission; EUP: seller's utility; EUD: delegate's utility; C(eM): e®ort cost; EUB: buyer's utility.
(¤) Surplus is the sum of the delegate's cost and the seller, delegate and buyer's utility. (¤¤) Loss
from bargaining failure is equal to Expected Surplus (pE(s)) minus Surplus. It can also be computed
as the expected surplus between s and z.
(¤¤¤) Welfare Loss against No Commitment is the di®erence between Surplus under No Commitment
and Surplus under Commitment.
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Ex Post Monitoring and Collusion
2.1 Introduction
In many economic situations involving agency relationships, monitoring has been
shown to be animportant instrument for the principal to alleviate incentive problems.
The principal hires a third party (a monitor) to obtain a signal about the agent's
private information or actions, which is used to increase output (or reduce cost)
and reduce the agent's rent. However, when the monitor is self-interested and may
collude with the agent, his worthiness to the principal may be reduced. In this
setting, interesting questions arise regarding the principal's choice of the monitor and
his function. In particular, is the timing to hire a monitor (i.e., to monitor the agent
before or after the outcome is realized) relevant to the principal? Should monitoring
be performed on agent's e®ort or productivity? If the monitor is self-interested, how
the answer to the previous questions is a®ected when there is a threat of collusion
between the agent and the monitor?
This chapter answers the second question by comparing e®ort monitoring andpro-
59ductivity auditing,1 and brie°y discusses the third question in the ex-post-monitoring
case. The ¯rst question (and the corresponding third question) is addressed in the
next chapter.
We show that all parties (principal, agent and monitor) obtain the same utility
under either e®ort monitoring or productivity auditing, provided that some conditions
on the distribution of the monitor's signal, the monitoring cost and e±ciency of the
side transfers between the monitor and the agent are satis¯ed, and that the monitor is
hired after the outcome is realized. Second, hiringa self-interested monitor introduces
potential collusion between monitor and agent. Given the previous result and that
the bene¯ts from collusion come from modifying the monitor's report, the cost to
prevent collusion is the same to the principal regardless of what is being monitored
(i.e., e®ort or productivity).
We present our results in a principal-agent framework with moral hazard and ad-
verse selection. It is well known that the principal generates ine±ciencies in order to
mitigate the asymmetric information problem (see for example Baron and Myerson
[3]). In addition, the principal may hire an ex post monitor to obtain information
(a signal) about the agent's private characteristic or e®ort and therefore reduce the
agent's information rent (Baron and Besanko [2] is an excellent treatment of this
point). An additional problem arises when the supervisor can collude with the agent.
When the agent is harmed by the monitor's signal, she may have incentives to bribe
1 This comparison is meaningful since both monitoring activities occur after the agent exerted
e®ort. There is no point in addressing this question before the agent exerts e®ort.
60the latter. The threat of collusion depends strongly on the timing of monitoring, the
degree of enforceability of side-contracts andthe characteristics ofthe monitor's infor-
mation. Kessler [33] shows that collusion can be avoided at no additional cost when
the monitor's information is hard (i.e., observable andveri¯able) andnon-forgeable in
an e®ort-monitoring setting. Kofman and Lawarr¶ ee [38] show that when information
can be forged, the collusion constraint increases the costs faced by the principal when
designing a contract for the other parties (this is done in a productivity-auditing
setting).2 From our previous result, we conclude that it is the ex post nature of the
monitoring relationship (and not what is being monitored) what drives these results.
The rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model and the
monitoring technology. Section 2.3 presents the main result of principal's indi®erence
between the two monitoring technologies. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Model
Consider a three-layer hierarchy: principal-monitor-agent. The principal hires the
agent to produce some output x for her (for instance, assume that the hierarchy is
a ¯rm and x is pro¯t). The agent exerts e®ort e and has private productivity µ
(µ 2 fµL;µHg;µH > µL > 0). A type-µH (type-µL) agent is more (less) productive.
Both productivity and e®ort are not observed by the principal. The agent's cost or
2 When the monitor supervises the agent before e®ort is exerted, Tirole [56, 58] shows that
collusion costs cannot be avoided.
61disutility of e®ort is g(e), increasing and strictly convex, with g(0) = g0(0) = 0.3 Let
q be the ex ante probability that the agent is type µH, i.e., q = Pr(µ = µH). The
agent produces an observable output or pro¯t x = µ +e, and is paid a compensation
t. Her reservation utility is simpli¯ed to U = 0.
After observing the outcome the principal decides whether to hire a costless mon-
itor.4 We consider two possibilities. First, the monitor observes an imperfect signal
of the agent's type that may take one out of three di®erent values. With probability
1 ¡ p, the monitor learns nothing about the agent's type (¾ = 0). Otherwise he ob-
tains a signal, which is imperfectly correlated with the agent's true type. The signal
¾ is correct with probability Pr(¾ = µjµ) = ® > 1=2. The principal obtains a report
r from the monitor (r 2 f0;L;Hg, where L corresponds to µL and H corresponds to
µH) and compares it with the agent's report (^ µ). The agent is punished when she is
found having misreported her type. The agent is protected by limited liability: the
punishment zr must be at most z. The bound z may be either low (the agent is
protected by some minimum legal wage), or high (wealth or legal constraints). We
assume that the monitor's compensation is non-negative (t ¸ 0).
The second possibility corresponds to e®ort monitoring (as in Kessler [33]). The
monitor obtains a signal ¾ about the agent's e®ort. The principal sets a benchmark
e®ort ~ e 2 (el ¡¢µ;el) (where ¢µ = µH ¡µL > 0) to detect shirking. As we will show
3 An extra assumption g000(e) ¸ 0 guarantees that the optimal contract is deterministic.
4 This is a simplifying assumption that does not change our main result (conditioned on the
monitor being hired) when there is a positive monitoring cost.
62later, if the type-µL agent exerts e®ort el, a type-µH agent will exert e®ort el ¡ ¢µ
if she shirks. With probability 1 ¡ p the monitor learns nothing about the agent's
e®ort (¾ = 0). Otherwise he observes that the agent shirked (e < ~ e) or did not shirk
(e ¸ ~ e). Conditional on the e®ort exerted by the agent, the signal is correct with
probability ® > 1=2.
The timing of the game is as follows: After nature chooses the agent's type µ, the
principal o®ers a set of contracts ft(x;r);zrg to the agent and w(x;r) to the monitor.
The three parties sign the contract. Ifthe agent accepts the contract, she exerts e®ort
e to produce an output x. The principal sends the monitor with some probability ± to
observe asignal ¾ about the agent's type. If they ¯nd it pro¯table, monitor and agent
meet to bargain over the monitor's report (in whose case they sign a side contract for
a transfer b from the agent to the monitor, who values it v(b) = kb, 0 · k · 1). Then
the monitor reports r to the principal. Finally, transfers t, w, punishment z and side
transfers are realized.
Assume that ®, p, k and the monitoring cost are the same under e®ort monitoring
and productivity auditing to rule out principal's preference of a particular technology
because of its reliability or cost.
All parties are risk-neutral. The agent, supervisor and principal's utility is UA =
w ¡ b ¡ g(e), US = w + b and UP = x ¡ t ¡ w, respectively. The two benchmark
cases without monitor are: i) ¯rst best contract, and ii) contract under asymmetric
information with no monitor.
63i) First Best: If the principal observes both agent's e®ort and type, she designs
a contract that maximizes her utility UP = µ + e ¡ t, subject to the agent's interim
participation constraint (t ¡ g(e) ¸ 0). The ¯rst-best (forcing) contract is an e®ort
recommendation eFB that satis¯es g0(eFB) = 1 and a wage w = g(eFB).
ii) No Monitor: When the principal does not observe both agent's e®ort and
type, she has to design a contract based only on the observable x. According to the
revelation principle (Baron and Myerson [3]), the principal can restrict herself to a
direct mechanism. Then, for an agent's report ^ µ there is an e®ort recommendation
e(^ µ) to produce a pro¯t x(^ µ) = ^ µ +e(^ µ). Let tj the wage and ej the e®ort when the
agent reports ^ µ = µj, j 2 fL;Hg. The contract must satisfy agent's participation and
incentive compatibility constraints. Let ¢µ = µH ¡ µL. The incentive compatibility
constraints are
tL ¡ g(eL) ¸ tH ¡ g(eH + ¢µ) and tH ¡ g(eH) ¸ tL ¡ g(eL ¡ ¢µ)
The optimal contract is such that only the type-µL participation constraint and
the type-µH incentive compatibility constraint are binding. In order to elicit high
e®ort from the type-µH agent, the principal pays her an information rent. To reduce
this rent, she elicits lower e®ort from the type-µL agent, who earns no rent.5
5 Assume eL ¸ ¢µ to make the incentive compatibility constraint meaningful.
642.3 Ex Post Monitoring
A monitor is of value to the principal since his report can be used to reduce the
type-µH agent's wage and increase the type-µL agent's e®ort. Consider ¯rst the case
of a benevolent monitor.
2.3.1 Benevolent Monitor
Suppose that the monitor audits the agent's productivity (auditor) and reports his
signal honestly. The principal does not send the auditor when she observes a high
output since the type-µL agent does not bene¯t from pretending to be more e±cient
(incentive compatibility ensures that only a type-µH agent produces high output).
But the principal sends the auditor (with probability ± 2 (0;1]) when she observes a
low output because the type-µH agent does bene¯t from shirking. According to the
revelation principle, the principal can restrict herself to ask for an agent's truthful
report ^ µ 2 fµL;µHg and propose an e®ort and compensation fe(^ µ);t(^ µ;x);zrg. Let eh
and th (el and tl) denote the agent's e®ort and compensation when the agent reports
^ µ = µH (^ µ = µL), and let zr be the punishment to the agent when the auditor reports
r 2 f0;Hg.6 Note that xl = µL + el. This outcome occurs when the type-µL agent
reports truthfully or when the type-µH agent shirks since she produces xl to pretend
to be less productive. Also, note that xh = µH + eh. The agent's constraints are
6 Given that principal sends the monitor to audit a type-µL agent in equilibrium, she does not
punish the agent when monitor's and agent's reports coincide.
65IR(L) : tl ¡ ±
£
p(1¡ ®)zH +(1¡ p)z0¤
¡ g(el) ¸ 0
IR(H) : th¡ g(eh) ¸ 0
IC(L) : tl ¡ ±
£
p(1¡ ®)zH +(1¡ p)z0¤
¡ g(el) ¸ th¡ g(eh+ ¢µ)
IC(H) : th¡ g(eh) ¸ tl ¡ ±
£
p®zH + (1 ¡ p)z0¤
¡ g(el ¡ ¢µ)
LL : zr · z; r 2 f0;Hg
(2.1)
Since the auditor is honest, the principal obtains the information at no cost, i.e.,
wr = 0, for r 2 f0;L;Hg. Let - = feh;el;th;tl;zH;z0;±g be the set of choice







p(1 ¡®)zH +(1¡ p)z0¤o
(2.2)
subject to constraints (2.1). The optimal contract is
g0(eh) = 1 eh = eFB
g0(el) = 1¡
¸3
1¡q fg0(el) ¡ g0(el ¡¢µ)g eL · el · eFB





g(eh)+ g(el)¡ g(el ¡ ¢µ) ¡p(2® ¡ 1)z
g(eh)
if ¸3 = q
if ¸3 < q
zH = z0 = z wr = 0; r 2 f0;Hg ± = 1
(2.3)
where ¸3 2 [0;q] is the shadow price of the IC(H) constraint. The proof of this result
is similar to that of Proposition 10 in next chapter, and hence is omitted.
Now consider the agent's constraints under e®ort monitoring (describedin Section
2.2). In order to compare the principal's problem under e®ort monitoring with that
66under productivity auditing, let zH denote the punishment to the agent when the
monitor reports that the agent shirked (i.e., when the monitor observed e < ~ e), and
z0 the punishment to the agent when the monitor reports that he found nothing. The
agent's participation, incentive compatibility and limited liability constraints are the
same as (2.1) and hence the principal's problem is exactly (2.2). Then we have the
following result:
Proposition 8 The optimal contract when the principal hires a benevolent monitor
to audit the agent's private information after the output is realized is the same as that
when the principal hires him to monitor the agent's e®ort.
This proposition highlights that what is relevant to the principal is ex post moni-
toring rather than its particular characteristics, provided that the signals from e®ort
monitoring and productivity auditing are equally informative and costly.7
2.3.2 Self-Interested Monitor
Problem (2.2) in the previous section is the building block to analyze the optimal con-
tract under collusionwhen the principal hires a monitor after the agent exerted e®ort.
We showed that productivity auditing and e®ort monitoring are utility-equivalent to
all the players if the accuracy of the monitor's signal and the cost to obtain it are the
same for both monitoring technologies.
7 In next chapter we use this result, together with those in next section, to simplify the monitoring
timing discussion to ex ante and ex post monitoring.
67When the monitor is self-interested, the threat of collusion between the monitor
and the agent becomes relevant to the principal. Both agent and monitor will bargain
over the monitor's report and sign a side-contract whenever they ¯nd it pro¯table to
do so. Hence, additional constraints are added to (2.1).
If the monitor's signal, which is also observed by the agent, is \hard and non-
forgeable" (as in Tirole [56]), the monitor can conceal his information, but cannot
forge it either with help from the agent or by blackmailing her. The principal may
want to prevent the agent-monitor coalition from changing a report r 2 fL;Hg to
r = 0.8 On the other hand, if information is hard and forgeable (as in Kofman
and Lawarr¶ ee [38]) or (as in Baliga [1]) the coalition may manipulate the monitor's
report, and the principal may want to prevent changes from r 2 f0;Hg to r = L (in
whose case the agent is not punished). In all these cases, the collusion constraints
involve avoiding changes in the monitor's report.9 Then, we extend the result from
the previous section to the case of collusion: Ex post monitoring does not depend on
what is being observed by the monitor (i.e., agent's productivity or e®ort) when the
monitoring technology, e±ciency of side transfers and monitoring cost are the same.
Consider now that the monitoring technologies are di®erent. Let fpP;®P;kP;cPg
denote the probability, informativeness of the signal about the agent's productivity,
8 This measure is not necessary in some cases. For example, the coalition will not ¯nd pro¯table
to hide a report r = L, since the agent is not punished in that case, and may be punished otherwise.
9 In this section we only show that the agent-monitor coalition has incentives to modify the
monitor's report. In next chapter we discuss how this problem is solved by the principal (see
Sections 3.4 to 3.6.
68side-transfere±ciency parameter andcost toobtainthesignal, andlet fpE;®E;kE;cEg
denote those corresponding to a signal about the agent's e®ort.
If a particular technology (e.g., productivity auditing) generates a more informa-
tive signal (i.e., ®P > ®E and/or pP > pE), or is less expensive to obtain (i.e., cP < cE
or kP < kE), it will dominate the other monitoring technology. Note that this result
does not depend on the linear technology chosen in this chapter (see Chapter 3).
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we show that the optimal contract with and ex post monitor does not
depend on what variable is being monitored (agent's e®ort or productivity), provided
that the signals of e®ort and type are equally accurate and costly.
This result extends to the case of hiring a self-interested monitor, independently
of the characteristics of the monitor's information (hard and non-forgeable, hard and
forgeable or soft), because the threat of collusion between the monitor and the agent
corresponds to changes inthe monitor's report (which does not depend onthe variable
observed).
The next chapter analyzes the trade o® that arises from the monitoring timing
choice (beforeor after the agent exertede®ort) under di®erent collusionenvironments,
which are de¯ned by the characteristics of the monitor's information.
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Optimal Monitoring Timing under Collusion
3.1 Introduction
The literature on the principal-agent problem has analyzed the role that monitor-
ing institutions (usually being exposed to collusion with agents) play in alleviating
incentive problems. Two branches of this literature have been studied separately.
The ¯rst one analyzes the e®ects of hiring a supervisor on the agent's incentives and
on the principal's contract design (see, for example, Tirole [56, 58] and La®ont and
Tirole [43], ch. 11). The supervisor obtains information about the agent's produc-
tivity before the agent exerts e®ort (we also refer to him as ex ante monitor). The
second branch of the literature studies the optimal contract when the principal hires
an auditor (see, for example, Baron and Besanko [2], Kofman and Lawarr¶ ee [38] and
La®ont and Tirole [43], ch. 12). The auditor obtains information about the agent's
e®ort or productivity after the agent exerted her e®ort (we also refer to him as ex
post monitor). We will refer to both of them as monitors when there is no need to
70distinguish them.1
However, not much attention has been given to what a®ects the choice between
the two monitoring institutions.2 There are reasons that justify the importance of
this problem. First, the evidence suggests the existence of both institutions. Owners
of ¯rms hire third parties to supervise employees, monitor their e®ort or audit their
private information. In regulation, governmental agencies intervene in industries (by
means of ex ante controls) or audit ¯rms' accounting data and expenses. Second, the
monitoring timing choice under collusion is not inconsequential since it has di®erent
e®ects on the agent's incentives, the stakes in collusion between the agent and the
monitor, and therefore the principal's utility. On the one hand, the supervisor's
report is used to design a \°exible" contract for the agent, in which output and the
agent's compensationarebasedonboththe agent's andmonitor'sreport. This creates
incentives for the agent to bribe the supervisor when the agent's rents are reduced,
which restricts the principal in the contract design. On the other hand, the principal
can use the auditor's report to punish the agent (provided that a punishment scheme
is available), but she cannot make the contracting of output depend on this report.
In this case, the agent has incentive to bribe the auditor to avoid being punished.
The principal faces a trade-o® between °exibility and rigidity-punishment, and the
threat of collusion is an important determinant of her decision.
1 Throughout the chapter we discuss the case of hiring one monitor and concentrate on monitoring
timing. The case of joint monitoring is left to future research.
2 An exception is Shavell [53], Kolstad et al. [39] and the references therein, who analyze the
stage of legal intervention or (benevolent) regulation of activities that generate externalities.
71We ¯ndtheoptimal solutiontothis trade-o®under di®erent informational environ-
ments. Special importance is given to the manipulation of the monitor's information,
which determines the quality of such information and the cost for the principal to
obtain a truthful report from the monitor.
In particular, we specify a general model (principal-monitor-agent hierarchy) that
allows for both supervising and auditing. The principal, who is uninformed about
the agent's productivity and e®ort, hires the agent to produce a good or service. In
addition, the principal mayhire aself-interested monitor toextract someofthe agent's
private information, which can be used to reduce the agent's rents. As a response, the
agent may bribe the monitor to change his report. This creates additional constraints
to the principal depending on the structure of the monitor's signal (which determines
thequality of theinformationandthe cost tothe principal to obtainit) andthe degree
of enforceability of the side-contract. Using the classi¯cation from the literature, we
consider three di®erent informational environments:
(i) \hard and non-forgeable" information, which means that the monitor has ver-
i¯able proof of his signal and may conceal it from the principal (see Tirole
[56, 58])
(ii) \hard and forgeable" information, which means that the monitor can falsify his
signal with help from the agent (see Kofman and Lawarr¶ ee [38])
(iii) \soft" information, which means that the monitor has no veri¯able proof of his
72signal, and hence may report anything (see Baliga [1], Faure-Grimaud et al.
[15]).
The third case is a more serious problem to the principal than the second case
is (which is more serious than the ¯rst). The quality of the monitor's information
is lower when it becomes \less reliable". Consequently, the cost to the principal of
obtaining a truthful reportfrom themonitor is higher. Nevertheless, it is important to
study each of these cases individually. Depending on the activity to be controlled, the
monitor may \ignore" relevant information to write his report (such as not reporting
perquisites), or may not obtain information when it is hard to dispose of.3 These are
examples of hard and non-forgeable information. In addition, the monitor may write
reports based on evidence pre-selected by the manager (such as audit reports in a
company's credit department), or distort information (alter payrolls, create ¯ctitious
personnel, manipulate quality tests, etc., see Dalton [12], p. 32). These last two cases
correspond to hard and forgeable information and soft information, respectively.
A general result that emerges from the optimal solution to the principal's trade-o®
is that the principal more probably hires the monitor to supervise the agent when the
quality of the monitor's information (measured by the degree of manipulation of it) is
poor and side transfers between the monitor and the agent are costly to be enforced.
As the quality of information is better or side transfers are more e±cient, the auditor
3 Dalton [12] described that \...safety and health inspectors usually telephoned in advance of
visits so that they would not see unsafe practices or conditions they would feel obliged to report."
(p. 48).
73becomes more valuable to the principal.
In particular, the solution to this trade-o® when the monitor and the agent can-
not enforce side-contracts is such that auditing is optimal when the principal has
strong punishment schemes or when the punishment is weak and the monitor's signal
is noisy. Otherwise, supervising is optimal when the punishment instrument is weak
and the signal about the agent's type is very informative. Given low punishment, the
supervisor is more valuable to the principal when he learns the \right" information
about the agent (which is more probable when his signal is accurate), for the prin-
cipal can reduce the agent's rents when she is certain about the agent's type. The
principal's choice is summarized in Table 3.1.
First, with hard information and enforceable collusive contracts, the threat of
collusion imposes no additional cost to auditing but does increase the cost of super-
vising. So collusion with hard information makes auditing more likely to dominate
supervising. Consider the contract under no collusion. The agent has an incentive
to bribe the supervisor to hide his signal when the agent's rents are reduced (which
happens when the supervisor observes the agent's type correctly). The principal has
to incur in higher costs to obtain a truthful report. With an auditor, the principal
designs a contract such that the agent is punished whenever the auditor does not ¯nd
favorable information (so the agent is also punished when the auditor observes noth-
ing). Incentives to conceal the auditor's information are eliminated at no additional
cost. Nevertheless, supervising is still optimal for weak penalties and precise signal.
74Table 3.1: Monitoring Timing and Collusion: Summary of Results
No Collusion/Collusion with Hard and Non-Forgeable Information
Weak Punishment Strong Punishment
Noisy Signal
E±cient Side Transfer¤ Auditor Auditor
Ine±cient Side Transfer¤ Auditor Auditor
Informative Signal
E±cient Side Transfer¤ Auditor Auditor
Ine±cient Side Transfer¤ Supervisor Auditor
Collusion with Hard and Forgeable Information or Soft Information
Weak Punishment Strong Punishment
Noisy Signal
E±cient Side Transfer Auditor Auditor
Ine±cient Side Transfer Supervisor Supervisor
Informative Signal
E±cient Side Transfer Auditor Auditor
Ine±cient Side Transfer Supervisor Auditor
¤ The e±ciency of side transfers classi¯cation corresponds to the Collusion with Hard and Non-
Forgeable Information case. The No Collusion case corresponds to the limiting case of ine±cient (or
non-enforceable) side transfers.
Second, wheninformationcanbeforged, collusionimposes additional costs toboth
supervising and auditing. The e®ect of collusion on the principal's timing choice
is ambivalent. On the one hand, the cost to the principal of obtaining a truthful
supervisor's report is higher thanthat under non-forgeable information. On the other
hand, this cost becomes positive when the principal hires an auditor.4 Supervising
4 The agent-auditor coalition does not bene¯t from concealing the auditor's signal but does
75is more likely to be optimal when punishment schemes are weak (the deterrent e®ect
of punishment is poor) for any precision of the signal, and when the signal is noisy
for any level of punishment (this is the case when the principal does not bene¯t from
an auditor's noisy signal), provided that side transfers between the agent and the
monitor are ine±cient.
Finally, the principal's utility and the monitoring timing under soft information
are the same as those under hard and forgeable information, and hence the results
in that case also hold under soft information. With soft information, the coalition
parties will change their report individually or jointly when they ¯nd it pro¯table to
do so. Joint deviations are taken care of in the forgeable information case. Moreover,
the principal can design a contract that reduces the coalition rents (or punishes the
coalition) when the agent and monitor's report ofthe monitor's signal do not coincide.
We can use these results to explain why top-level managers in organizations (such
as CEOs, who may be more exposed to punishments) are usually audited, while
low-level employees (typically with low incomes or protected by minimum wage reg-
ulations) are supervised during the production stage. We also apply our results to
regulation of \hazardous" activities, and discuss the optimality of the ex ante stage of
intervention (in Law enforcement) when the regulatory agency is able to manipulate
its information.
We connect many works dedicated to monitoring and/or collusion in hierarchies,
bene¯t from the auditor reporting the correct agent's type.
76which apply to either supervising or auditing. Baron and Besanko [2] analyzed the
optimal design of a regulatory contract when the government hires a benevolent reg-
ulator to audit a ¯rm. They obtain a separation result that the pricing decision does
not depend on the auditing decision (which means that the price and quantity when
the ¯rm is audited are the same as those when the ¯rm is not audited), but the
auditing decision depends on the pricing decision (in particular, the principal sends
the auditor when she infers that the ¯rm overstated the price). Tirole [56, 58] and
La®ont and Tirole [42], [43] (ch. 11) analyze the optimal contract under collusion
between a self-interested supervisor/regulator (or power groups) and an agent in a
hard-and-non-forgeable-information framework. Kessler [33], Khalil and Lawarr¶ ee
[34] and La®ont and Tirole [43] (ch. 12) analyze the e®ects of collusion on con-
tract design in an auditor-based hierarchy under di®erent information environments.
Faure-Grimaud et al. [16] show the equivalence of two hierarchical organizations un-
der soft information: a collusive supervisor and the delegation to the supervisor of
contracting with the agent. A similar result is obtained by Faure-Grimaud et al. [15]
in a model with an auditor. Kofman and Lawarr¶ ee [38] show that a second auditor
is valuable to the principal, for he can be used to discipline an internal auditor when
information is hard and forgeable. Baliga [1] shows the equivalence of the principal's
utility when information is hard or soft in Tirole's [58] stylized model. (We generalize
this result to an equivalence between the principal's utility under hard and forgeable
information and that under soft information.) However, none of them studies the op-
77timality of supervising as compared with auditing. Finally, as we mentioned before,
the Law and Economics literature (Cohen [9], Kolstad et al. [39], Shavell [53] and
the references therein) has analyzed the optimal stage of regulation of activities that
generate externalities in a benevolent-regulator framework. We show that hiring a
self-interested regulator has e®ects on the optimal regulatory stage.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the model. Section 3.3
sets the benchmarks (No Monitor and No Collusion). We study the e®ect of collusion
on the monitoring timing decision under various information structures (hard and
non-forgeable, hardand forgeable and soft information) inSections 3.4 to 3.6. Section
3.7 provides applications to organization design and regulation. Finally, Section 3.8
concludes.
3.2 Model
Consider a hierarchy consisting of an owner (principal), a monitor (supervisor or
auditor) andamanager (agent).5 Theprincipal hires the agentto produce agood with
gross valueV andproductioncost C = ¹ µ¡µe. The payo® to the principal isV ¡¹ µ+µe.6
The cost C, which is observed by the principal, is reduced by a combination of agent's
productivity and e®ort, which are not observed by the principal. By exerting higher
5 We also consider other hierarchies, such as owner-headman-worker, government-regulator-
¯rm/contractor.
6 This speci¯cation of the model nests regulation models (with cost function C) and organization
models (with pro¯t function ¼ ¼ µe).
78e®ort the agent reduces the production cost, but she derives a private e®ort disutility
or cost Ã(e) = e2=2.7 The agent's private productivity or type is µ 2 fµL;µHg, with
µH > µL > 0. Let q be the ex ante probability that the agent's productivity is high,
i.e., q = Pr(µ = µH). The parameter ¹ µ is an upper bound on the production cost.8
The principal reimburses the cost C and pays a net transfer t to the agent. The
agent's reservation utility is normalized to U = 0.
The principal also decides whether to hire a monitor who observes an imperfect
signal about the agent's productivity (this signal is also observed by the agent).
The monitor obtains the signal at no cost (the results extend to a costly monitor,
provided that he is hired). The signal may take the followingvalues: Withprobability
1 ¡ p the monitor learns nothing about the agent's type (¾ = 0). Otherwise he gets
an imperfect observation of the agent's type (¾ 2 fL;Hg), which is correct with
probability ® > 1=2. This assumptionsatis¯es the monotone likelihoodratioproperty
that a correct signal is more probable. Table 3.2 summarizes the possible signals and
their corresponding probabilities.
With the new information, the principal may set a ¯ne or reduce the agent's wage
whenever she ¯nds that the agent misreported her type or shirked. The agent is
protected by limited liability when punished: an eventual ¯ne zr set by the principal
(depending on the monitor's report r) must be up to some liability maximum z.
7 We assume a quadratic e®ort cost to obtain simple solutions to the optimal contract. The
results can be generalized to more general (convex) functions.
8 We show later that the e®ort exerted by a type-µH agent is e = µH, and hence we assume that
¹ µ > µ2
H for the observed cost to be positive in all the cases analyzed here.
79Table 3.2: Monitor's Signal of Agent's Type
¾ Probability Observation µ
0 1¡ p 0 µH
H p® µH µH
L p(1¡ ®) µL µH
0 1¡ p 0 µL
H p(1¡ ®) µH µL
L p® µL µL
The liability bound may be interpreted as exogenous wealth constraints or exogenous
maximum legal punishment.
When her rents arereduced, the agent may bribe the monitor to changehis report.
The principal will be a®ected by this threat of collusion di®erently, depending on the
structure of the monitor's information and the enforceability of side contracts.9 We
consider three cases of information structure. First, the signal may be \hard", in
the sense that the monitor's observation is veri¯able to the principal. The monitor
can conceal information, but cannot forge it either with help from the agent or by
blackmailing her. Second, information may be hard and forgeable. The monitor may
make up a report with the agent's help. Finally, information may be soft, in whose
case the monitor is not able to provide the principal with a veri¯able proof of his
9 In order to focus only on the e®ects of collusion on the contract design and monitoring timing,
we assume that side contracts are enforceable (transfers may be ine±cient) and non-renegotiable,
and hence we obtain an upper (lower) bound on the utility that the coalition (principal) can achieve.
For a discussion on this point, see Tirole [58].
80report. We allow for ine±cient side transfers b from the agent to the monitor (whose
valuation of the transfer is v(b) = kb, 0 · k · 1).
The monitor sends a report r 2 f0;L;Hg to the principal, who pays him a wage
w. He is protected by limited liability (w ¸ 0). His reservation utility is normalized
to 0.
In addition, the principal has to decide whether to send the monitor before or
after the agent exerted e®ort. In the ¯rst case, the monitor supervises the agent
and obtains a signal about the agent's productivity (e®ort has not been exerted
yet). In the second case, the monitor may either audit the agent's productivity or
monitor e®ort. Given the cost structure (C = ¹ µ ¡ µe), the information obtained by
the principal is the same whether monitoring generates a signal ¾ on productivity
or e®ort, provided that the signals are equally precise and costly (see Chapter 2).
Whether monitoring is ex ante or ex post (on e®ort or productivity), we assume the
same distribution of signal (same p and ®) and the same cost (c = 0) to eliminate a
possible source of timing preference. Hence we concentrate on (ex ante or ex post)
productivity monitoring for convenience in the exposition.
In order to make the timing decision, the principal compares costs and bene¯ts
under each alternative. If she hires a supervisor, she obtains a report that can be
used to contract output and wage. This gives some °exibility to the output choice,
for the principal can create distortions according to the probability of the events in
order to reduce the agent's rent. On the other hand, when the principal hires an
81auditor, she does not bene¯t from the °exibility in contracting output, but she can
punish the agent when she ¯nds that the agent misreported her type (or shirked).
There is a trade-o®: °exibility in contracting vs. rigidity plus punishment.10
The timing of the game is as follows.
1. Nature chooses the agent's type µ. The agent learns her type.
2. The principal decides the monitoring timing. If a supervisor is hired, he
observes a signal ¾ (which is also observed by the agent).
3. The principal o®ers a set of contracts: t(C;r) to the agent (ft(C;r);zrg if the
agent is audited) and w(C;r) to the monitor. The three parties sign the contract.
4. If a supervisor is hired, he meets the agent to negotiate over his report r. Then
he reports to the principal.
5. The agent chooses e®ort e. The cost C is realized.
6. If an auditor is hired, he (and the agent) observes a signal ¾, and meets the
agent to negotiate over his report r. Then he reports to the principal.
7. Transfers, punishment and side transfers are realized.
We assume that the three parties are risk neutral. Since there are both moral
hazardandadverse selection, a transfer of the hierarchy fromtheprincipal totheagent
is not optimal.11 The principal, agent and monitor's utility is UP = V ¡ [t+ w +C],
10 As we will show in detail in Sections 3.4 to 3.6, collusion imposes di®erent cost to these decisions
depending on the information structure of the monitor's signal.
11 Limited liability to the monitor ensures that a transfer of the hierarchy from the principal to
the monitor is not possible.
82UA = t¡ b¡ e2=2 and UM = w + kb, respectively.
When the principal observes both agent's e®ort and type, the problem simpli¯es
to choose e®ort and transfers in order to maximize V ¡ ¹ µ +[µe ¡ t], for µ 2 fµL;µHg,
subject to the agent's interim participation constraint t ¡ e2=2 ¸ 0. The solution to
this problem is: eFB
j = µj, tFB
j = µ2
j=2, for j = L;H. The principal's expected utility
is EUFB
P = V ¡ ¹ µ + [qµ2
H + (1¡ q)µ2
L]=2.
3.3 Benchmarks: No Monitor, No Collusion
In this section we present the two relevant benchmarks of the timing problem. The
lower bound on the principal's utility is achieved by contracting with the agent di-
rectly. The upper bound is achieved when the agent and the monitor cannot sign
enforceable side-contracts (k = 0), so that the principal obtains the monitor's signal
at no cost.
3.3.1 No Monitor
Suppose that the principal does not observe either agent's e®ort ortype. The contract
o®ered by the principal should be conditioned only on the observable C. Because of
the binary nature of the problem and the fact that C is deterministic for a given
agent's type, we can concentrate on forcing contracts. As it is well known from
revelation principle, the principal can restrict herself to Bayesian direct mechanisms
based on an agent's truthful report. For a report ^ µ there is an e®ort recommendation
83e(^ µ) to achieve a production cost C(^ µ) = ¹ µ ¡ ^ µe(^ µ). When the agent reports ^ µ = µL
(^ µ = µH) and the principal observes a cost CL (CH), the principal pays the agent a
transfer tL (tH) and recommends to exert e®ort eL (eH). Let ¢µ = (µL=µH)2 < 1
and R = 1 ¡ ¢µ < 1. A feasible contract to the agent must satisfy the individual
rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints
IR(L) : tL ¸ e2
L=2 IC(L) : tL ¡ e2
L=2 ¸ tH ¡ e2
H=2¢µ
IR(H) : tH ¸ e2
H=2 IC(H) : tH ¡ e2
H=2 ¸ tL ¡ e2
L¢µ=2
A standard result is that when the constraints IR(L) and IC(H) are binding,
IC(L) and IR(H) are not binding (the proof is standard and hence omitted). The
principal's problem with the binding constraints IR(L) and IC(H) is to choose eL and
eH to maximize





















































In order to elicit high e®ort from the high-productivity agent (who has incentives
to claim that she is ine±cient), the principal pays her an information rent. Eliciting
lower e®ort from the low-productivity agent reduces this rent, which depends on the
high-productivity agent's gains from misreporting.
84To avoid paying rents, the principal may o®er a No-Rent contract to be accepted
only by the high-productivity agent: t = µ2
H=2 if theobservedproductioncost is CH =
¹ µ ¡µ2
H, and nothing otherwise. The principal's utility is EUNR
P = q
©




Weassume parameters suchthatthe principal's utility under the No-Monitor contract
is higher than that under the No-Rent contract (it is su±cient to assume a high V ).
3.3.2 No Collusion
The monitor's signal adds new information about the agent's type that can be used
in the main contract. We solve for the contract with a supervisor or an auditor
separately, and show the conditions such that the principal chooses either of them.12
Contract with a Supervisor
Before the agent exerts e®ort, the supervisor reports his signal r = ¾ to the principal,
who uses it to contract agent's e®ort and wage. Let the agent's e®ort be ejr and
her compensation be tjr when she reports ^ µ 2 fµL;µHg and the monitor reports
r 2 f0;L;Hg in a direct mechanism. The constraints for a feasible contract are
IR(jr) : tjr ¸ e2
jr=2
IC(Hr) : tHr ¡ e2
Hr=2 ¸ tLr ¡ e2
Lr¢µ=2
IC(Lr) : tLr ¡ e2
Lr=2 ¸ tHr ¡ e2
Hr=2¢µ
for j 2 fL;Hg; r 2 f0;L;Hg (3.2)
Let ¼jr denote the probability of occurrence of each state, where j 2 fL;Hg and
12 In some cases, the optimal contract for a given monitor has been analyzed elsewhere and we
compute it with the assumptions made here. We acknowledge the original author in each case.
85r 2 f0;L;Hg.13 Since collusion is not possible the principal sets wjr = 0. As in
the No-Monitor contract, if constraints IR(Lr) and IC(Hr) are binding, the other
constraints are non-binding. The principal's problem with the binding constraints is
to choose fejrg to maximize

























The optimal e®ort and compensation are:





(1¡ q)®+ q(1¡ ®)R
eLH =
(1¡ q)(1¡ ®)µL














; wjr = 0; j 2 fL;Hg and r 2 f0;L;Hg (3.5)
The next Proposition summarizes this result (see Tirole [56]).
Proposition 9 The optimal contract when the principal hires a supervisor and side-
contracts cannot be enforced satis¯es (3.4)-(3.5). The supervisor is hired always.
We can observe the bene¯ts of °exibility in contracting from equations (3.4)-
(3.5). The principal pays no rent to the type-µL agent for any monitor's report,
but cannot eliminate the rents to the type-µH agent. Let the agent's rents in state
Hr be RHr = Re2
Lr=2. The optimal contract is such that eLL > eL0 > eLH and
13 There are six states whose probabilities are ¼L0 = (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ p), ¼LL = (1 ¡ q)p®, ¼LH =
(1 ¡ q)p(1¡ ®), ¼H 0 = q(1 ¡ p), ¼HL = qp(1¡ ®), and ¼HH = qp®. We will use this simpli¯cation
throughout this chapter.
86RHL > RH0 > RHH. By obtaining the signal before the agent exerts e®ort, the
principal ¯nds it pro¯table to create higher distortions in the low-probability state
LH(she reduces eLH), which allows her to pay lower rents RHH inthe high-probability
state HH. Also, the principal reduces distortions in the high-probability state LL (she
increases eLL), which leads to higher rents RHL in the low-probability state HL. In
the limiting case of perfectly informative signal (® = 1), the high ine±ciencies and
rents are ex ante costless (states LH and HL have probability 0).
Contract with an Auditor
The principal can use the report from an auditor only to contract compensations
since the agent already exerted her e®ort. From Revelation Principle, the principal
can relate a low production cost (or high output) to a type-µH agent. In this case
there is no need to perform an audit, and the agent is paid th. When the production
cost is high (or output is low), the principal cannot infer whether this is because
the type-µL agent has exerted the right e®ort or the type-µH agent has shirked (the
agent is paid tl). In this case the principal sends the auditor (with probability ±)
and penalizes the agent when the auditor's report does not match with the agent's
type report. Fines are z0 if r = 0 and zH if r = H. Using these results, the agent's
participation and incentive constraints are
87IR(L) : tl ¡ ±
£
(1 ¡ p)z0+ p(1¡ ®)zH¤
¸ e2
l =2
IC(L) : tl ¡ ±
£
(1 ¡ p)z0+ p(1¡ ®)zH¤
¡ e2
l=2 ¸ th ¡ e2
h=2¢µ
IR(H) : th ¸ e2
h=2
IC(H) : th ¡ e2
h=2 ¸ tl ¡ ±
£




The principal pays wr = 0 to the auditor for any report, and sends him with
probability ± = 1. Let -ep = feh;el;th;tl;z0;zHg be the set of choice variables. The
principal's problem is to choose -ep to maximize
V ¡ ¹ µ + qfµHeh ¡ thg + (1¡ q)
©






subject to constraints (3.6) and the limited liability constraints z0, zH · z; w0, wL,
wH ¸ 0. Let ®¤
1 denote the value of ® such that IR(H) is non-binding for ® < ®¤
1, and
®¤
2 the value of ® such that IC(H) is non-binding for ® > ®¤
2 (from equations (3.27)



















The optimal e®ort and compensation are (see Baron and Besanko [2]):
® < ®¤
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+(1 ¡ p®)z; z0 = zH = z; w0 = wL = wH = 0 (3.9)
The next Proposition summarizes the optimal contract.
88Proposition 10 The optimal contract when the principal hires an auditor and side-
contracts cannot be enforced satis¯es (3.8)-(3.9). The auditor is hired always.
Proof: See Appendix.
This contract is less °exible than the contract with a supervisor since the agent's
e®ort is not a®ected directly by the auditor's report. This report is used to punish
the agent (which a®ects the agent's net compensation) when the principal obtains
no favorable information about the agent's type. In particular, for a given informa-
tiveness ® of the monitor's signal, the threat of punishment is enough to deter the
type-µH agent from misreporting when the liability bound is high enough, and the
principal achieves ¯rst-best utility.14 This result is summarized in the next Corollary.
Corollary 2 For any degree informativeness of the signal ®, the principal achieves
¯rst-best utility when the punishment bound z is relatively high.
Proof: Fix a value of ®. The principal achieves ¯rst-best utility if ® > ®¤
2, which is
satis¯ed when z > zB, and zB = µ2
LR=p(2®¡ 1). Q.E.D.
Optimal Timing without Collusion
In this section we discuss the principal's monitoring timing decision when side con-
tracts between the agent and the monitor cannot be enforced. When the principal
14 Note, however, that the principal punishes the type-µL agent in equilibrium. When the type-
µH agent reports truthfully, she is not audited (see Kofman and Lawarr¶ ee [38]). This result of
punishment in equilibrium is common in the literature on collusion under uncertainty (see, for
example, Green and Porter [24]), in which the colluding parties use a self-policing instrument that
triggers when a bad outcome occurs (which can be caused by nature or by other party's deviation).
89hires a supervisor, she ¯nds pro¯table to distort allocations and minimize the agent's
expected rents depending on the supervisor's signal. On the other hand, the auditor's
signal cannot be used to modify allocations, but can be used to punish the agent.
Not surprisingly, the information of an auditor is very useful to the principal
when the latter can punish the agent strongly. As we show in the Appendix (Proof of
Theorem 1), there exists a minimum liability bound ¹ z such that an auditor is optimal
for z > ¹ z for any precision of his signal.15
For a given punishment instrument z < ¹ z, the principal hires the monitor to
supervise the agent when his signal is informative of the agent's type, and to audit
the agent when his signal is noisy (See Figure 3.1). Inthis case, the principal is able to
reduce the type-µH agent's rent when the supervisor observes a \correct" signal (that
is, ¾ = H, which is more probable when ® is high). The next Theorem emphasizes
the importance of monitoring timing in absence of collusion.
Theorem 1 Suppose that side-contracts between the agent and the monitor cannot
be enforced. Auditing is optimal when the principal's punishment instrument is strong
(z is relatively high), or when it is weak and the monitor's signal of the agent's type
is noisy (low ®). Supervising is optimal for a weak punishment instrument (low z)
and an informative signal (high ®).
Proof: See Appendix.
15 In a paper on Law enforcement, Shavell [53] shows that the availability of harm-based sanctions
is an important determinant of the (ex post) legal intervention stage.
90Figure 3.1: Optimal Timing: Non-Enforceable Side Contracts
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Suppose now that the principal is constrained to monitor the agent's type, so that
the problem is when to obtain information that is available at the outset. Another
interpretation of Theorem 1 is that the principal can strategically delay the gathering
of relevant information. In particular, this is so when the punishment instrument
is su±cient to deter the agent. As we show later, these results become stronger
with collusion under non-forgeable information (although the main trade-o® is not
eliminated), but may revert when information is forgeable or soft.
Next, we present the principal's response to change in parameters. Assume that
the liability bound z is such that z < ¹ z, so that there exists a cut-o® ®C 2 (1=2;1] of
the monitor's signal informativeness for which a supervisor is optimal when ® > ®C
and an auditor is optimal otherwise. Then, we have the following
Result 1 Consider as reference the informativeness of the monitor's signal ®.
91² The cut-o® ®C increases in z. Auditing is optimal for a broader region of the
informativeness of the monitor's signal as the liability bound increases.
² The cut-o® ®C decreases in R. The region of optimality of a supervisor expands
out as the adverse selection problem is more severe.16
Proof: See Appendix.
The ¯rst result is a direct implication of Theorem 1. The second result is a
consequence of the way the principal designs the contract. The supervisor's signal
is useful to reduce the agent's rent in the more probable state (RHH < RH0). The
auditor's signal is only useful to punish the agent (whose rents are the rents under the
No-Monitor contract net of the expected punishment, see th in (3.8)). When the type
distribution is more disperse, which implies a more severe adverse selection problem
(measured by a higher R), the ¯rst contract is more suitable to control the agent's
rent. For a given ® and z, the decrease in the principal's utility with a supervisor is
lower than that in the utility with an auditor, and the intersection occurs at a lower
®. Therefore, the region of optimality of a supervisor expands out.
3.4 Collusion: Hard and Non-Forgeable Information
In the remaining of the chapter we allow for collusion between the agent and the
monitor. In this section, we assume that the monitor's information is hard and non-
16 This result applies to the case in which the agent still earns some rent when audited (i.e.,
parameters are such ®¤
1 ¸ 1 in equation (3.8)), and for q · 1=(1 + R).
92forgeable, so the monitor discretion lies in concealing his signal from the principal.
We also assume that the monitor has all the bargaining power when he bargains with
the agent over a side transfer, and hence makes a take-it-or-leave-it o®er to the agent.
Side transfers may be ine±cient: a transfer b from the agent is valued v(b) = kb by
the monitor (with 0 · k · 1).
3.4.1 Contract with a Supervisor
The agent's participationandincentive compatibility constraints in afeasible contract
are (3.2). The supervisor's participation and limited liability constraints are
wjr ¸ 0; for j 2 fL;Hg; r 2 f0;L;Hg17 (3.10)
The supervisor's discretion lies in concealing his signal. To avoid collusion, the
principal has to compensate the coalition so that concealment of the signal is not
pro¯table for the coalition members. Let the agent's rent be Rjr = tjr ¡ e2
jr=2. A
feasible contract must also satisfy the simpli¯ed coalition constraints
CC(HH) : wHH + kRHH ¸ wH0 + kRH0
CC(HL) : wHL+ kRHL ¸ wH0+ kRH0
(3.11)
The coalition constraints are (3.33) in the Appendix given that the monitor does
not know the agent's type at the side-contract stage. As we show in the Appendix,
theseconditionssimplify to(3.11) whenthe IR(Lr)andIC(Hr)constraintsare binding
17 The supervisor's compensation must be non-negative (limited liability). Also, it must satisfy
his participation constraint, which is qwH r + (1¡ q)wLr ¸ 0, for r 2 f0;L;Hg (since the supervisor
does not know the agent's type). These constraints are satis¯ed when wages are non-negative.
93(which it will be true in an optimal contract). The simpli¯ed coalition constraints
are as if the monitor knew that the agent's type is µH when o®ering a side-contract
to the agent.18
As we de¯ned in footnote (13), the probabilities of occurrence of each state are
¼jr. The principal's problem is to choose e®ort and compensations to maximize
V ¡ ¹ µ +
X
j2fL;Hg;r2f0;L;Hg
¼jrfµjejr ¡ tjr ¡ wjrg (3.12)
subject to (3.2), (3.10) and (3.11). De¯ne ®h such that constraint CC(HH) is binding










2pk if k > 0
1=2 if k = 0
(3.13)
The optimal e®ort and wage are



















18 In Tirole [56], the supervisor knows the agent's type when he obtains a signal. This corresponds
to ® = 1 in our model.













; wLr = 0 r 2 f0;L;Hg




The proof of Proposition 11 shows this result, together with the conditions for an
optimal contract (Tirole [56]).
Proposition 11 The optimal contract when the principal hires a supervisor with hard
and non-forgeable information satis¯es (3.14)-(3.15). The supervisor is always hired.
Proof: See Appendix.
Take the contractunder nocollusion((3.4)-(3.5)) as benchmarktoanalyzehow the
principal changes it when the agent-supervisor coalition can conceal the supervisor's
information. The type-µH agent's rent when ¾ = L is higher than that when ¾ = 0.
Hence the principal does not change eLL (from its value in the no-collusion contract)
since concealment of the supervisor's signal is not pro¯table to the agent.
When the signal is ¾ = H, the type-µH agent will bribe the monitor to hide
his signal. The principal has two ways to avoid it and obtain the true signal. The
cheaper way is to compensate the monitor with the adjusted agent's rent (which is
wHH = k(RH0 ¡ RHH)). The \coalition rent" is RHH + wHH = kRH0 + (1¡ k)RHH
in state HH, and RH0 in state H0. The agent's rent under a signal ¾ = 0 spreads
over state HH, while her rent under a signal ¾ = H is lowered (to a proportion
951 ¡ k). Therefore, the principal reduces eL0 and increases eLH (from the values in
the no-collusion contract). This option is pro¯table when the supervisor's signal is
accurate (® > ®h). The more expensive way is not to distort allocations in the states
under con°ict and set eL0 = eLH (and hence RH0 = RHH). This option is pro¯table
when the supervisor's signal is noisy (® · ®h). Nevertheless, the supervisor is always
valuable to the principal.
From equation (3.13), the cut-o® value ®h increases in k (in particular, ®h = 1=2
if k = 0, and ®h = 1 if k = 1). When ® · ®h, allocations are not modi¯ed as k
increases. When ® > ®h, the principal either pays a higher coalition rent or switches
to the more expensive option as the side transfers are more e±cient. Therefore, the
principal's utility is non-increasing in k. Moreover, this utility is lower than that
under no collusion for any p < 1.19 This result is summarized next.
Corollary 3 When the principal hires a supervisor, collusion imposes costs on the
optimal contract. In particular, the principal's utility is lower than that under no
collusion, and is non-increasing in the side-transfer e±ciency parameter k.
3.4.2 Contract with an Auditor
As in Section 3.2.2, an audit is performed when the production cost is high, which
is incurred by a type-µL agent (but it can be incurred by a deviant type-µH agent).
19 This can be checked by comparing e®orts and compensations (3.4)-(3.5) and (3.14)-(3.15). In
the limit case of p = 1, collusion is not a threat since the supervisor cannot claim having not seen
anything, and the solution is the no-collusion contract.
96The principal punishes the agent when the auditor ¯nds unfavorable information to
the agent. In those cases, the type-µL agent is willing to bribe the auditor in order to







But the contract (3.8)-(3.9) is already designed such that the agent has no incen-
tive to bribe the monitor (since zH = z0 and wH = w0), and hence eliminates all
stakes in collusion. Hence, we have the following result (Kessler [33] shows this result
for e®ort monitoring):
Corollary 4 When the principal hires an auditor with hard and non-forgeable infor-
mation, collusion imposes no cost to the principal.
3.4.3 Optimal Timing
Corollaries 3and 4providethenecessary informationtoanalyze the e®ects ofcollusion
on the principal's timing decision. When the principal hires a supervisor, she can still
use the signal to achieve some °exibility in contracting. Of course, this °exibility
either comes at a cost of paying the supervisor to report his signal truthfully or is
limited to avoid concealing the signal. When the principal hires an auditor, she avoids
collusion at no cost. Then we have the following
20 The auditor does not know the agent's type at the side-contracting stage. Using similar tech-
niques as those to prove condition (3.11), the simpli¯ed coalition constraint is (3.16).
97Proposition 12 When the principal hires a monitor with hard and non-forgeable
information:
(i) Theorem 1 applies when the side transfers are ine±cient (low k). That is,
- Auditing is optimal when the punishment instrument is strong (high z), or
when the punishment is weak and the signal is noisy (low ®).
- Supervising is optimal when the punishment instrument is weak (low z)
and the signal is precise (high ®).
(ii) The region of optimality of a supervisor shrinks as side transfers are more e±-
cient (k increases).
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As side transfers are more e±cient (k is higher) the region of
optimality of a supervision narrows down.
98The optimal timing results from Section 3.3.2 hold here when side transfers are
ine±cient (k is low), since the cost of avoiding collusion (captured in k) is low. As
side transfers become more e±cient, an auditor is more likely to be preferred. Note,
however, that the principal will hire the monitor to supervise the agent when his
signal is informative and punishment is weak, even under e±cient side transfers (see
Figure 3.2).
3.5 Hard and Forgeable Information
Now we turn to the case in which the agent-monitor coalition can manipulate the
monitor's report. It is straightforward to note that the contracts in Sections 3.3.2
and 3.4 are no longer optimal. Whenever the agent-monitor coalition is paid higher
in one state of the world, the parties can coordinate a change in reports.
3.5.1 Contract with a Supervisor
The (simpli¯ed) coalition constraints in a feasible contract are as follows. From
Section 3.3.2, the principal sets eLL > eL0 > eLH and hence RHL > RH0 > RHH,
where RHr is the agent's rent in state Hr, for r 2 f0;L;Hg (see (3.4)-(3.5)). Hence a
type-µH agent will bribe the supervisor to change his report from 0 or H to L. The
99principal eliminates the coalition bene¯ts to forge the signal if:21
CC(H0-HL) : wH0 + kRH0 ¸ wHL + RHL









2 such that constraint CC(H0-HL) is binding with wH0 > 0 for ® > ®
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2p(1¡ k)
(3.18)






































; wLr = 0; r 2 f0;L;Hg
wHL = 0; wH0 = k(tHL ¡ tH0); wHH = k(tHL ¡ tHH)
(3.20)
The next Proposition summarizes the optimal contract.
Proposition 13 The optimal contract when the principal hires a supervisor with hard
and forgeable information satis¯es (3.19)-(3.20).
21 Conditions (3.17) are derived using similar techniques as those used to prove conditions (3.11).
100Proof: See Appendix.
First, let us interpret the coalition constraints. The agent's rent in state Hr is
RHr = Re2
Lr=2. Suppose that the principal o®ers a contract such that RH0 < RHL
and wH0 = wHL. The coalition will change the supervisor's report to r = L. On the
other hand, if RH0 > RHL, the coalition will change the report to r = 0. When the
principal avoids collusion in one direction, she creates stakes in collusion in the other
direction. In general, an optimal contract must have
wH0 + kRH0 = wHL +kRHL = wHH + kRHH
Thiscontract, whichisdesignedto avoidchangingthesupervisor's reportto r = L,
also prevents coalition deviations in any direction (e.g., in state HH there will not be
incentives to claim that the state is H0, etc.).
The contract (3.19)-(3.20) shows that the supervisor's signal must be of some
minimum accuracy for the principal to hire him. Two reasons explain this result.
First, a noisy signal is not very informative of the agent's type. Second, when the
supervisor's report canbemanipulated, the information value of the signal is reduced.
Hence, we have the following
Corollary 5 When information is hard and forgeable, the supervisor is hired if his
signal exceeds a minimum degree of informativeness (i.e, ® > ®
f
1).
Contracting is more °exible as the signal becomes more informative of the agent's
type. The principal only distorts e®ort eLH (from eL0 = eLL) for ®h
1 < ® · ®h
2, while
she sets eLL > eL0 > eLH when ® > ®h
2.
101Hiring a supervisor is pro¯table to the principal when side transfers are ine±cient.
In the (opposite) limiting case of e±cient side transfers (k = 1), the principal has
to transfer the whole agent's rent to the supervisor to avoid forgery, and hence deals




Finally, when ® = 1 (not included in (3.19)-(3.20)), forgery is not possible (but
concealment is) because the supervisor, who observes the agent's type correctly, can-
not claim having seen ¾ = L (¾ = H) when the agent reports µH (µL) truthfully, but
can claim having observed ¾ = 0. In this case, the contract is (3.14)-(3.15).
3.5.2 Contract with an Auditor
As it is shown in Section 3.3.1 (no collusion), the principal audits the agent when the
observed cost is high, which is incurred by a type-µL agent (but it can be incurred by
a deviant type-µH agent). The principal does not punish the type-µL agent when the
auditor's report is r = L, which leads the agent to bribe the auditor to make up any
report to r = L.22 Therefore, the (simpli¯ed) coalition constraints are
CC(0L) : w0 ¡ kz0 ¸ wL
CC(HL) : wH ¡ kzH ¸ wL
(3.21)
We solve for the optimal contract in the Appendix. Consider the three cut-o®s ®1
(an auditor is not hired for ® < ®1, see (3.40) inthe Appendix), ®2 (the type-µH agent
22 Again, (3.21) is obtained with similar techniques as those used to prove conditions (3.11).
102earns positive rent for ® < ®2, see (3.41)) and ®3, (an auditor is sent with probability
less than 1 for ® > ®3, see (3.42)). We repeat ®1 (which determines whether the
auditor is hired or not) for convenience.
®1 =
q +(1 ¡ q)k
2q + (1 ¡q)k
(3.22)
The optimal contract satis¯es (see Kofman and Lawarr¶ ee [38] for the limiting case of
p = 1):23


















































eh =µH; w0 = wL =0; wH =kzH; z0 =0; zH =z if ®> ®1 (3.24)
This result is summarized in the next Proposition.
Proposition 14 The optimal contract when the principal hires an auditor with hard
and forgeable information satis¯es (3.23)-(3.24).
Proof: See Appendix.
The principal designs compensations suchthat w0¡kz0 = wL = wH¡kzH. There-
fore, the coalition¯nds unpro¯table to forge the signal in any direction. In particular,
23 When the principal hires an auditor and pays him a positive wage, she faces a commitment
problem after the outcome is realized. Once the agent makes a truthful report, the incentive for the
principal to send an auditor vanishes. We assume that the principal created some reputation to hold
her word (see Khalil and Lawarr¶ e [34]). This commitment issue does not arise when the principal
hires a supervisor.
103the principal punishes the type-µL agent when she \infers" a high productivity. This
occurs when the monitor's report is r = H. To obtain a truthful report, the principal
compensates the auditor with wH = kzH.
Opposite to the case with a supervisor, the principal may still hire the auditor
when side transfers are e±cient (®1(k = 1) < 1). But as in that case, the auditor is
not hired when his signal is noisy (®1 > 1=2). As before, manipulation of information
makes the noisy signal less valuable. We have the following
Corollary 6 The principal contracts with the agent directly when the auditor's signal
is noisy (i.e., ® < ®1).
As the signal is more accurate, the punishment instrument is used to reduce the
agent's rent. For certain combination of signal accuracy and punishment (which
corresponds to ® > ®3), the punishment is su±ciently deterrent to extract the type-
µH agent's rent andobtainan honest report from him. In this case, the principal sends
the auditor with probability less than 1, which reduces the expected compensation to
the auditor.
3.5.3 Optimal Timing
In this section we discuss how forgery of the monitor's signal a®ects the principal's
timing decision. For low penalties, a supervisor is more pro¯table to the principal
when he obtains the \right" information about the agent's type. The contract (3.19)-
(3.20) is designed such that the type-µH agent's rent is reduced in the high-probability
104state HH (in particular, RHH · RH0 · RHL), while the type-µL agent's e®ort in-
creases in the high-probability state LL (eLL ¸ eL0 ¸ eLH). When information is
forgeable, stakes in collusion are created because the agent will bribe the supervisor
to change a report r 2 f0;Hg to r = L. The principal must compensate the super-
visor in states H0 and HH to obtain a truthful report (or, eventually, she does not
distort e®orts). The cost of controlling collusion increases partially (compared to the
case of information concealment).
On the other hand, the contract with an auditor (3.23)-(3.24) is designed such
that the type-µL agent is punished when the auditor's report is r = H (i.e., when he
observes the wrong signal). The auditor must be compensated to report truthfully,
for he will be bribed by the agent to report r = L otherwise. The threat of collusion
imposes positive cost (controlling collusion is costless when information can only be
concealed), which is higher when the signal is noisier. The relevant trade-o® under
hard and forgeable information is °exibility in contracting with additional collusion
costs vs. punishment with positive collusion costs, and the optimal timing decision
may di®er from that under hard and non-forgeable information (in Section 4). The
next Theorem summarizes the main results (the results for ®
f
1 < ®1 are represented
in Figure 3.3).24
Theorem 2 Suppose that the monitor's information is hard and forgeable.
(i) When parameters are such that ®
f
1 < ®1 (from (3.18) and (3.22), respectively):
24 The values ¹ z1 and ¹ z2 are computed in the proof of Theorem 2.
105- Supervising is optimal for all ® 2 [®
f
1;1] when the punishment is weak
(z < ¹ z1).
- For intermediate levels of punishment (z 2 [¹ z1; ¹ z2]), there exist two cut-o®
values of ®, ®C
1 and ®C
2, such that auditing is optimal for ®C
1 · ® · ®C
2
and supervising is optimal otherwise.




1 and auditing is optimal for ® > ®C
1 .
(ii) When parameters are such that ®
f
1 ¸ ®1, ®C
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A: Auditor; S: Supervisor; NM: No Monitor.
106The cut-o® ®C
2 plays the role of ®C in Sections 3.3.2 (optimal timing) and 3.4.
In those sections we showed that a monitor is hired to supervise the agent when his
signal is accurate (i.e., for ® > ®C) and the punishment instrument is weak, and to
audit the agent otherwise. In this section, we obtain the same result for high ®.
From Corollaries 5 and 6, a monitor (supervisor or auditor) is hired if his signal
exceeds some minimum level of informativeness of the agent's type (®
f
1 and ®1, re-
spectively). When information is forgeable, there is additional value of supervising
when the signal is noisy. This happens when ®
f
1 < ®1. In this case, the auditor is
too costly (the cost to avoid an agent's bribe is higher than the e®ect on the agent's
incentives) that the principal would rather contract with the agent directly. But it
is possible that the supervisor's signal is su±ciently informative for the principal to
bene¯t from distorting allocations (and hence a °exible contract is optimal). Note
that the existence of this region does not depend on the strength of the punishment
instrument. Under these circumstances, the supervisor is optimal even for unbounded
penalties.
Next, we discuss the e®ect of a change in the structural parameters on the optimal
timing decision. Assume parameters such that there exist both ®C
1 and ®C
2 (that is,
¹ z1 < z < ¹ z2). De¯ne the length of the interval [®
f
1;®C




length of the interval [®C
2 ;1] as S2 = 1¡ ®C
2 . We have the following
Result 2 Consider as reference the informativeness of the monitor's signal ®.
² An increase in the liability bound z decreases both S1 and S2. Therefore, an auditor
107is optimal for a broader range of ® as the punishment is stronger.
² The intervals S1 and S2 are non-decreasing in the degree of adverse selection (R).
Therefore, a supervisor is optimal for a broader range of ® as R increases.25
² The e®ect of an improvement in the e±ciency of side transfers k on S1 is undeter-
mined, but it decreases S2. Auditing is more probable for high values of ®.
Proof: See Appendix.
The results for S1 still hold if z > ¹ z2. When the punishment instrument is strong,
an agent exposed to audits is more deterred from misreporting her type, while an
agent under supervision is not a®ected. Therefore an auditor is more probable to be
hired.
The agent's information rent increases as the adverse selection problem is more
severe (higher R). The °exibility from a contract with a supervisor allows the princi-
pal to manipulate this rent depending on the supervisor's signal (while the contract
with an auditor is very rigid in that sense). It is more probable that the principal
will hire a supervisor (strictly, both S1 and S2 are non-decreasing in R).
Consider now an increase in the e±ciency of side transfers (higher k). The re-
sponsiveness of the decision to hire a supervisor is lower (higher) than that of the
decision to hire an auditor for low (high) k (compare ®
f
1 and ®1). We may expect S1
to increase (decrease) for lower (higher) values of k. A supervisor is more pro¯table
for low k, but he becomes relatively more expensive (compared to the auditor) as
25 The proof is done assuming parameters such that ®
f
1 > ®1 (so that ®C
1 exists), ®2 ¸ 1 (the
agent receives some rent when audited), and q · 1=(1+ R).
108collusion is more serious. In the limiting case of k = 1 the supervisor is not valuable
at all, while the principal can use an auditor for ® > 1=(1 +q).
On the other hand, the e®ect of an increase in k on S2 is more evident. The
increase in the compensation to the auditor (which happens when he obtains a wrong
signal) is very small when ® is high. But the increase in the compensation to the
supervisor is high since the latter is paid more when he obtains a correct signal.
Therefore, an auditor is more probable to be hired if side transfers are more e±cient,
provided that his signal is very informative of the agent's type.
An interesting extension is to allow for the e±ciency in side transfers to depend
on the stakes in collusion. In particular, side transfers may be more ine±cient as
bribes involve higher amounts (they can be modeled as k(b) with k0(b) < 0), which
corresponds to the fact that it may be more di±cult to hide higher bribes. In our
model this means that kS > kA (where S and A stand for supervisor and auditor,
respectively) when the punishment is strong. On the other hand, when the liability
bound is low compared to the agent's rents, the opposite may happen (i.e., kA >
kS).26 Our previous results become stronger under this generalization. We showed in
Theorem 2 that auditing is more probable to be optimal as z increases. Consequently,
given that side transfers are more ine±cient with higher stakes, there are additional
reasons to hire an auditor. On the other hand, when z is low, there are more reasons
to hire a supervisor given that side transfers are more ine±cient in this case.
26 Note that this discussion is not relevant in the hard-and-non-forgeable-information case, since
avoiding collusion is costless when the principal hires an auditor.
1093.6 Soft Information
In this section we study how the principal's timing choice changes when the monitor's
information is soft (i.e., he has no veri¯able proof of his signal), in whose case any
manipulation of information is possible. The principal is (expected to be) more
constrained in the choice of contracts. Two main problems arise when the contract
from Section 3.3.2 (no collusion) is o®ered to the agent and monitor. First, as in
Section 3.5, the agent-monitor coalition will change reports when the parties ¯nd it
pro¯table. Second, the supervisor will change a report unilaterally when there are
gains from doing so.
The next Theorem states that the principal can achieve the hard-and-forgeable-
information utility (from Section 3.5) in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Hence, all
the discussion in that section can be applied to soft information.
Theorem 3 When the monitor's signal is soft (i.e., he has no veri¯able proof of it),
the principal achieves the same utility as that when information is hard and forgeable.
i) The optimal contract is (3.19)-(3.20) in the supervisor case and (3.23)-(3.24) in
the auditor case.
ii) The optimal timing decision is as in Theorem 2.
iii) When ® = 1 the principal achieves the hard-and-non-forgeable-information utility.
Proof: See Appendix for Parts i) and ii). Part iii) is straightforward from Section 3.5.
Q.E.D.
110This utility equivalence result derives from the fact that the principal can con-
trol collusion at no additional cost (compared to the hard-and-forgeable-information
case). Suppose that the principal o®ers a collusion-free contract (i.e., a contract
that does not take collusion constraints into consideration). Then, the monitor-agent
coalition has incentives to make up a pro¯table signal (and the agent provides the
monitor with the relevant information to do it).27 Even easier for the coalition par-
ties, when information is soft, they will coordinate reports without any need to proof
them. Moreover, since the agent knows the monitor's signal, the principal can use an
agent's report of that signal in the mechanism. By minimizing compensations when
the reports about the monitor's signal di®er, the principal can eliminate unilateral
changes in reports. Note that whether information is veri¯able or not, in many cir-
cumstances the monitor is valuable to the principal (i.e., when the accuracy of his
signal exceeds a minimum ®
f
1 or ®1, depending on the monitoring timing), who pays
him accordingly to obtain a truthful report.
We mentioned in the Introduction that Baliga [1] ¯nds an utility equivalence
result between soft information and hard and non-forgeable information in Tirole's
[58] model.28 Theorem 3 generalizes this result by showing that the principal can
achieve the utility with hard-and-forgeable-information (from Section 3.5). Baliga's
27 Of course, this result depends on the assumption that the agent provides this information
costlessly.
28 This model assumes adverse selection and no cost-reducing e®ort. The monitor observes either
the agent's true type or nothing (that is, ® = 1 and 0 < p < 1). The monitor's \soft" signal is about
the agent's high productivity.
111result applies to the limiting case of a perfectly informative signal (® = 1), in whose
case the principal's utility under hard and forgeable information is the same as that
under hard and non-forgeable information.
Some authors argue that supervising may be linked to \softer" information (see
Dalton [12]). For example, Tirole says that \... The general observation is that it
is usually hard to obtain information from intermediate levels of a hierarchy. Both
Cozier and Dalton insist that very often common sense directs the controller to fal-
sify his information to allow the monitored group to obtain better results..." (Tirole
[56], p. 184). Under this assumption, the advantages of auditing the agent would be
evident. But, as it is observed in many circumstances, auditing may lead to \forge-
able" information. The controlled person may \point out" relevant information for
the controller to provide proof of his report (see Kofman and Lawarr¶ ee [38]). As we
have shown here, the consequences of these two information structures on the prin-
cipal's decision are the same. Therefore, in this environment there are no gains of
auditing employees with the hope of changing to a \harder" information environment
if information can still be forged.
We have to alert about the robustness of the optimal contract under soft infor-
mation (contrary to the case with hard information) to other coalition formations.
With hard information, a coalition against the agent to change the monitor's signal
cannot form since the agent also observes the monitor's signal. A coalition against
the monitor is not pro¯table (he is who provides the additional report to the princi-
112pal). However, under soft information, if the auditor and principal meet to change
the auditor's report from L to H to punish the agent, there is no reason not to make
it (and the agent cannot say that the signal was e®ectively L). We can assume in
this case that the principal sets a punishment on herself when the auditor and agent's
report of the monitor's signal di®er (the Equilibrium in Proposition 3 is not altered,
since self punishment by the principal occurs out of the equilibrium path).
3.7 Applications
Organization of the Firm
From our discussion in the previous sections, we conclude that auditing is optimal
whenthe punishment instrument is strongfor any informationstructure (except when
the hard and forgeable or soft information is noisy). Instead, there is more room for
a supervisor when the punishment instrument is weak and his information is very
informative about theagent's type (regardless of the quality), or when his information
is noisy and soft.
These results are consistent with typical organizational structures, in which low-
level workers (typically with lower incomes or protected by minimum wages) are
supervised during production stage, while top-level managers (such as CEOs or top-
level managers, who typically areable torespondto ¯nes up tosome level) areexposed
to audits.
As we mentioned before, it is reasonable to think that information from supervi-
113sors is \softer", while information from auditors may be \forgeable" (See Section 3.6).
Hence, the results in the previous paragraph extend to these more general scenarios.
Regulation
The literature on regulation and information (La®ont and Tirole [43] and others)
has studied ex ante and ex post regulation separately (which provides the building
blocks forthis work). The theoretical framework developedhere nests bothregulatory
stages. Table 3.1 in the Introduction provides a summary of the optimal regulatory
stage under di®erent information environments when collusion is present (see page
75).
The Law andEconomics literature (see Shavell [53], Kolstadet al. [39])hasstudied
the optimal regulatory stage of activities that generate externalities witha benevolent
regulator. Consider, for example, the case of a hazardous activity with \disastrous"
consequences. From Section 3.3.2 (in which we add incentives), and in accordance
with the standard recommendation, the government should put all the e®orts in ex
ante regulation whenever the liability faced by the injurer is low (as it is the case
when the bad outcome involves irremediable consequences).29 Ex post regulation
is recommended when the injurer can be strongly punished. This recommendation
may be modi¯ed when the regulatory agency is self-interested. When the regulator's
29 For example, Cohen [9], pp. 45-46, shows estimates of very low penalties compared to the
environmental damage done by oil spills.
114information concerning the damages caused by the injurer can be manipulated, there
are circumstances under which the ex post regulation is no longer optimal even when
punishment is strong. The high stakes in collusion and a noisy report are reasons
for the government to concentrate e®orts in preventing unwanted damages through
ex ante regulation (see Sections 3.5 and 3.6). In general, we provide another source
of enforcement cost: the threat of collusion between the regulatory agency and the
private party under di®erent information environments.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we study the case of one-time monitoring in hierarchies. We provide
insights on the optimality to the principal of using monitoring timing as a choice
variable when collusion is present. Previous literature has analyzed both monitoring
cases separately or studied the timing with a benevolent regulator. We show that
the monitoring timing decision imposes a trade-o® to the principal and provide the
solution to this trade-o®. Under hard information, a supervisor is optimal when his
signal re°ects the agent's productivity accurately, and an auditor is optimal when his
signal is noisy, provided that the punishment instrument is limited. An auditor is
optimal when the principal can expose the agent to severe ¯nes. When information
is soft (or hard and forgeable), there are circumstances where a supervisor is optimal
when his signal is noisy even for unbounded penalties.
Once we understand the forces that drive the principal to choose auditing or
115supervising under di®erent collusion environments, it is natural to ask how these
e®ects work when there is repeated interaction among the parties. An important
issue that arises from this situation is the availability to the principal of instruments
to reduce the noise of the monitor's signal or the manipulation of (hard and forgeable
or soft) information.
We assume that the principal has to decide betweenex ante or ex post monitoring.
However, when the principal has access to both monitors who are not related and
do not share information, there is no reason for the principal not to choose both
monitors if gathering information is costless.30 However, when the monitors share
some information, additional collusion constraints may arise, which may lead the
principal to redesign the optimal contract. This problem becomes relevant when
information is forgeable or soft. We leave this case to future research.
There is a more general question of strategic timing. In our framework, the prin-
cipal optimally chooses to delay the monitoring to later stages when she hires an
auditor (in particular, when e®ort monitoring is not available). This result is a case
of strategic timing, since under some circumstances the principal delays the gathering
of relevant information that is available in the beginning of the game. Along these
lines, there is a broader question that has to do with strategic contracting. Theoret-
ical models assume that grand contracts are designed at the beginning of a general
30 There is research along these lines (with a benevolent regulatory agency). For example, Kolstad
et al. [39] show that ex ante and ex post regulation may be complements depending on the injurer's
uncertainty of his potential liability.
116game. By constraining the set of decisions at some period of the game, the parties
may get some bene¯t at later stages. For example, in a paper on collusion and dele-
gation, La®ont and Martimort [41] show that a principal ¯nds pro¯table to delegate
to the supervisor the direct contracting with an agent.
1173.9 Appendix to Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 10: When the principal hires a benevolent auditor, she pays
him wr = 0 for r 2 f0;L;Hg. Constraint IC(L) is non-binding when the others are
satis¯ed. The Lagrangian to problem (3.7) is
L = V ¡ ¹ µ + qfµHeh¡ thg +(1 ¡ q)
©
µLel ¡ tl +
£
(1 ¡ p)z

































The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
Leh = qµH ¡ (¸2 +¸3)eh · 0; eh ¸ 0; Leheh = 0
Lel = (1¡ q)µL ¡ (¸1 ¡ ¸3¢µ)el · 0; el ¸ 0; Lelel = 0
Lth = ¡q + ¸2 +¸3 · 0; th ¸ 0; Lthth = 0
Ltl = ¡(1 ¡ q) +¸1¡ ¸3 · 0; tl ¸ 0; Ltltl = 0
Lz0 = (1¡ q) ¡ ¸1 + ¸3 = 0; if Lz0 < 0; z0 = 0; if Lz0 > 0; z0 = z
LzH = (1¡ q)(1¡ ®) ¡ ¸1(1¡ ®) + ¸3® = 0
if LzH < 0; z
H = 0; if LzH > 0; z
H = z
together with the participation and incentive compatibility constraints. The solution
involves positive el and eh. From the participation constraints, tl and th are both
positive. Then Leh = Lth = 0, which implies that the type-µH agent exerts ¯rst-best
e®ort eh = µH. Also, Lel = Ltl = 0 and
(1¡ q)µL = [¸1 ¡ ¸3¢µ]el (3.25)
(1 ¡q) = ¸1 ¡ ¸3 (3.26)
Using (3.26), Lz0 = 0 and hence z0 = z without loss of generality. Also, LzH =
¸3(2® ¡ 1) ¸ 0 and then zH = z. This is a maximum deterrence result (see Baron
and Besanko [2]).
Next we consider the three possible cases for the relationship between IC(H) and
IR(H): either of them or both of them are binding.
118Case 1: ¸2 = 0 and ¸3 = q. IR(H) is non-binding and IC(H) is binding. Using
equations (3.25) and (3.26), el = (1 ¡ q)µL=[(1 ¡ q) +qR]. Using the IR and IC
constraints, tl = e2
l =2 + (1 ¡ p®)z, th = µ2
H=2 + e2
lR=2 ¡ p(2® ¡ 1)z. This is the
solution if IR(H) is non-binding (i.e., e2










4pz [(1¡ q)+ qR]
2 (3.27)
Case 2: ¸2 = q and ¸3 = 0. IR(H) is binding and IC(H) is non-binding. Using
(3.26) in(3.25) we have el = µL. Fromthe IC andIRconstraints, tl = µ2
L=2+(1¡p®)z,
th = µ2
H=2, and IC(H) must hold as inequality (i.e., µ2
LR=2 < p(2® ¡ 1)z), which is












Case 3: Both ¸2 and ¸3 are non-negative (and both less than or equal to q).
Using IR and IC constraints, the type-µH agent's rent must be zero, i.e., e2
l R=2 =
p(2® ¡ 1)z. Hence, el =
p
2p(2®¡ 1)z=R. Using equations (3.25) and (3.26), ¸3 =
(1¡q)(µL=el ¡ 1)=R. The agent compensation is tl = µ2
L=2+(1¡p®)z andth = µ2
H=2.
The Lagrangian is concave since it is linear in compensations and punishments,
there are no cross terms among them and e®orts, and the second derivative with
respect to e®ort is negative. The summary of e®ort and compensations is presented
in equations (3.8)-(3.9). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: De¯ne UH = V ¡ ¹ µ + q
µ2
H
2 . The principal's utility with a
supervisor is
EU NC






(1 ¡ q)® + q(1 ¡ ®)R
+
p(1 ¡ ®)2
(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ®) + q®R
+
1¡ p








> > > > > > > > <




2[(1 ¡ q) + qR]
+ qp(2® ¡ 1)z = EU NM
P + qp(2® ¡ 1)z if ® < ®¤
1









1 · ® · ®¤
2
EU FB




1 is from (3.27) and ®¤
2 is from (3.28), EUNM
P is equation (3.1), EUFB
P is
the ¯rst-best utility, and the superscript NC stands for no collusion. The ¯rst part
of this utility function is increasing and linear in ®, the second part is concave and
the last part is constant. By construction, the principal's utility is continuous in all
parameters.
If z = 0, EUNC
P (A) = EUNM
P , while EUNC
P (S) > EUNM
P . On the other hand,
when z is very high, EUNC
P (A) > EUNC
P (S) for all ®. So, for intermediate values
of z, EUNC
P (S) intersects EUNC
P (A) at some cut-o® value ®C such that EUNC
P (S) >
EUNC
P (A) for ® < ®C, and EUNC
P (A) < EUNC
P (S) for ® > ®C. Also, as z increases
EUNC
P (A) increases, while EUNC
P (S) remains the same for a given ®, and hence there
exists a critical liability bound ¹ z such that EUNC
P (A) > EUNC
P (S) for all ® when
z > ¹ z. Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 1: The region of optimality of a supervisor expands out as adverse
selection is more severe (i.e., R increases, caused by an increase in µH). The proof
is done assuming that parameters are such that ®¤
1 ¸ 1 (from equation (3.27)) and
q · 1=(1 + R). We show that EUNC
P (S) decreases less than EUNC
P (A) does as R
increases. When this is the case, the new intersection occurs at a lower value of ®
(keeping all the other parameters ¯xed). From equations (3.29) and (3.30), eliminate
the common parts UH and (1 ¡ q)2µ2





(1¡ q)® + q(1 ¡ ®)R
+
p(1¡ ®)2
(1¡ q)(1 ¡ ®) + q®R
+
1 ¡ p







[(1 ¡ q) + qR]
¶
(3.31)


















4 +2®2(1 ¡®)2 ¡®(1¡®)
i
(1¡q)2qR >0
The ¯rst term is positive, the second term is non-negative and the third term is non-
positive. But note that (1 ¡ q)2q2 ¸ q3R3 and (1¡ q)3 ¸ q3R3 when q · 1=(1 + R),
and that the sum of all brackets simpli¯es to 1¡ 4®+ 4®2 > 0, for ® > 1=2. Hence,
120inequality (3.31) is satis¯ed. Q.E.D.
Constraints for an optimal contract under collusion with hard and non-
forgeable information: We¯rst simplifythe conditions tobe satis¯edby anoptimal
contract, and then show the simpli¯ed coalition constraints (3.11). In all cases, j 2
fL;Hg and r 2 f0;L;Hg. A feasible contract must satisfy the agent's participation
and incentive constraints (3.2), repeated here for convenience.
IR(jr) : tjr ¸ e2
jr=2
IC(Hr) : tHr ¡ e2
Hr=2 ¸ tLr ¡ e2
Lr¢µ=2
(3.32)
Also, it must satisfy the supervisor's limited liability constraints (wjr ¸ 0) and
the agent-supervisor coalition constraints. These constraints are as follows. The
supervisor's degree of discretion is to conceal his signal. At the time of meeting the
agent, the supervisor does not know the agent's type, and hence has updated beliefs
Pr(µHj¾ = H) =
q®
q® +(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ®)
Pr(µLj¾ = H) =
(1¡ q)(1¡ ®)
q® +(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ®)
Pr(µHj¾ = L) =
q(1¡ ®)
q(1¡ ®) +(1 ¡ q)®
Pr(µLj¾ = L) =
(1¡ q)®
q(1 ¡®) + (1¡ q)®
In order to avoid concealment of information, the principal has to pay the coalition
a higher wage when the monitor's signal is either L or H than that when the signal
is 0, i.e.,
(H)
Pr(µHj¾ = H)[wHH + kRHH] + Pr(µLj¾ = H)[wLH + kRLH] ¸
Pr(µHj¾ = H)[wH0 +kRH0] + Pr(µLj¾ = H)[wL0 + kRL0]
(L)
Pr(µHj¾ = L)[wHL + kRHL] +Pr(µLj¾ = L)[wLL + kRLL] ¸
Pr(µHj¾ = L)[wH0 + kRH0] +Pr(µLj¾ = L)[wL0 + kRL0]
(3.33)
In an optimal contract, the principal leaves norents tothe type-µL agent (RLr = 0,
since the latter does not have incentives to individually misreport her type), and
pays tLr = e2
Lr=2. Constraints IC(Hr) are also binding (standard result), and tHr =
121e2
Hr=2 + RHr, where RHr = Re2
Lr=2. Since the agent earns no rent in states L0, LL
and LH, the principal can pay wL0 = wLL = wLH = 0 to the supervisor (the coalition
does not bene¯t from changing the supervisor's report given the agent's type). Using
all these results in (3.33), we have that
CC(HH) : wHH +kRHH ¸ wH0 + kRH0
CC(HL) : wHL + kRHL ¸ wH0 + kRH0
These are equations (3.11) in the text. Hence, a contract that solves the principal
problem subject to the constraints IR(Lr) and IC(Hr) (from (3.2)), limited liability
(3.10), and (3.11) also solves the problem with the more general constraints (3.33).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 11:31 The Proof of Condition (3.11) contains the relevant
constraints to be satis¯ed in an optimal contract. In all cases, r 2 f0;L;Hg. The
participation constraints IR(Lr) and incentive constraints IC(Hr) are binding (and
then it is straightforward to show that constraints IR(Hr) and IC(Lr) hold strictly).
Then RLr = 0 and RHr = Re2
Lr=2. The supervisor's compensation is such that
wLr = 0 and wH0 = 0 (in this last case, the monitor has no information and cannot
forge it). We solve the optimization problem making constraint CC(HH) binding,
and then check that constraint CC(HL) is always non-binding with wHL = 0.

































This program is concave. From the ¯rst-order conditions for a maximum we have
eH0 = eHL = eHH = µH eL0 =
(1 ¡q)(1¡ p)µL
(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ p) + qR[(1 ¡ p(1 ¡ ®k)]
eLL =
(1¡ q)®µL
(1¡ q)® + qR(1 ¡®)
eLH =
(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ®)µL
(1¡ q)(1¡ ®) +qR®(1¡ k)
31 In the proof of Propositions 11 and 13 we will simplify the state probabilities as ¼L0 = (1 ¡
q)(1¡p), ¼LL = (1¡q)p®, ¼LH = (1¡q)p(1¡®), ¼H 0 = q(1¡p), ¼HL = qp(1¡®), and ¼H H = qp®.
122It is easy to check that eLL > eL0 and hence RHL > RH0. Constraint CC(HL)
holds strictly with wHL = 0. On the other hand, eL0 > eLH (and then RH0 > RHH)
if and only if ® > ®h, where
®h =
8
> > > <
> > > :
¡[2(1¡ p) ¡ k] +
q
[2(1¡ p) ¡ k]
2 +4pk(1¡ p)
2pk
if k > 0
1=2 if k = 0
(3.34)
When ® · ®h, e®ort and compensations are such that eLH = eL0, tHH = tH0 and
wHH = 0 (that is, CC(HH) is binding at wHH = 0), where
eL0 = eLH =
(1¡ q)(1¡ p®)µL
(1¡ q)(1¡ p®)+ qR(1¡ p(1¡ ®))
When p = 1, concealment is not possible and hence the coalition constraints are
no longer relevant. The solution to the principal's problem is as in (3.4)-(3.5).
From the results above, the principal always hires the supervisor. E®ort and com-
pensations are summarized in equations (3.14)-(3.15). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 13: The proof of the Proposition is similar to that of Propo-
sition 11. In all cases, j 2 fL;Hg and r 2 f0;L;Hg. First, we solve the optimal
contract with the binding constraints IR(Lr), IC(Hr), CC(H0-HL) and CC(HH-HL)
(from equations (3.2) and (3.17)), and then we check the conditions under which the
other constraints are strictly satis¯ed. Without loss of generality we can set wLr = 0.
Also, wHL = 0 since this is the most expensive state to pay the monitor a collusion-
proof wage. We summarize the state probabilities as ¼jr (see footnote 31 in page

































The program is concave. From the ¯rst-order conditions for a maximum we have:
eH0 = eHL = eHH = µH eLL =
(1 ¡q)p®µL
(1 ¡ q)p® +qR[k + p(1¡ ®)(1¡ k)]
eL0 =
(1¡ q)µL
(1¡ q)+ qR(1¡ k)
eLH =
(1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ®)µL
(1¡ q)(1¡ ®) +q®R(1¡ k)






k + (1 ¡k)p
2p(1¡ k)
(3.35)
The second case is eLL = eL0 > eLH (for ® · ®
f
2). Plugging this restriction into
the program and solving for e®ort levels, we have eLH as before and
eL0 = eLL =
(1¡ q)(1¡ p(1¡ ®))µL
(1¡ q)(1¡ p(1¡ ®)) + qR[1¡ p®(1 ¡ k)]
Next, eL0 = eLL > eLH if ®
f









Otherwise, the solution involves not hiring the supervisor for ® · ®
f
1. The results
are summarized in equations (3.19)-(3.20). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 14: An optimal contract must satisfy (3.6), (3.21) and the
limited liability constraints. Constraints (3.21) are binding (otherwise, there are
bene¯ts from joint deviations). Also, wL = 0 (since eventual forgery is to change the
monitor's report to r = L) and wr = kzr (the principal obtains an honest report), for
r 2 f0;Hg. The principal sends the (costly) auditor with probability ± 2 (0;1]. The
Lagrangian of the principal's problem is (V ¡ ¹ µ is omitted):
L = qfµHeh ¡ thg + (1¡ q)
©
µLel ¡ tl + ±(1¡ k)
£
(1¡ p)z

























¡ tl + ±
£







The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
124Leh = qµH ¡ (¸2 +¸3)eh · 0; eh ¸ 0; Leheh = 0
Lel = (1¡ q)µL ¡ (¸1 ¡ ¸3¢µ)el · 0; el ¸ 0; Lelel = 0
Lth = ¡q +¸2+ ¸3 · 0; th ¸ 0; Lthth = 0
Ltl = ¡(1 ¡ q) +¸1 ¡ ¸3 · 0; tl ¸ 0; Ltltl = 0
Lz0 = (1¡ q)(1¡ k) ¡ ¸1+ ¸3 = 0; if Lz0 < 0;z0 = 0; if Lz0 > 0; z0 = z
LzH = (1¡ q)(1¡ ®)(1 ¡k) ¡ ¸1(1 ¡®) + ¸3® = 0;








if L± <0;± = 0; if L± >0; ± =1
together with the participation, incentive and coalition constraints. The solution
involves positive el and eh. From the participation constraints, tl and th are both
positive. Then Leh = Lel = Lth = Ltl = 0 and eh = µH. Also
(1¡ q)µL = [¸1 ¡ ¸3¢µ]el (3.37)
(1 ¡q) = ¸1 ¡ ¸3 (3.38)
Using (3.38), Lz0 = ¡(1¡ q)k < 0 and then z0 = 0. On the other hand,
LzH = ¸3(2® ¡ 1)¡ (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ®)k (3.39)
The relevant cases from a combination of ¸2 and ¸3 (such that ¸2 +¸3 = q) are:
* Case 1: The highest value for ¸3 is q. An auditor is not pro¯table, and the
principal contracts with the agent directly (No-Monitor-Contract), when (3.39) is
negative. This is true for ® < ®1, where
®1 =
q +(1 ¡ q)k
2q + (1 ¡q)k
(3.40)
125Otherwise, zH = z and the principal hires the auditor in the remaining cases.




; tl = e2
l =2 +p(1 ¡ ®)z
th = µ2
H=2+ Re2
l =2¡ p(2®¡ 1)z; w0 = wL = 0; wH = kz
Plugging this information in L±, we have that ± = 1. The type-µH agent's rent is
Rh = e2
l=2 ¡ p(2® ¡ 1)z. This is the solution if the agent earns a positive rent







4pz [(1¡ q)+ qR]
2 (3.41)




2pz(2® ¡ 1)=R; tl = e2
l=2+ p(1¡ ®)z; th = µ2
H=2
w0 = wL = 0; wH = kz; ¸3 = (1¡ q)(µL=el ¡ 1)=R
The probability ± is equal to 1 if L± ¸ 0, which after tedious algebra reduces to
®2 · ® · ®3, where ®3 solves the following quadratic equation
2pz[(2®¡ 1) +(1 ¡ ®)Rk]
2 = (2®¡ 1)Rµ2
L (3.42)
* Case 4: When ® > ®3, equation (3.42) does not hold, and the principal sets ± < 1
(where L± = 0). Higher punishment implies higher collusion cost, which can be
minimized by reducing the auditing probability. The solution for this case is
el =
(2®¡ 1)µL















L = 0; w
H = kz; ± =
(2® ¡ 1)Rµ2
L
2pz[(2® ¡ 1)+ (1¡ ®)kR]
2
When ® = 1 this case reduces to Case 5, in which ¸3 = 0. Constraint IC(H) holds
strictly, i.e., Rh < 0, which is satis¯ed if z > Rµ2
L=2p. The solution is
el = µL; tl = e2
l=2; th = µ2
H=2; w0 = wL = 0; wH = kz; ± 2 (0;1]
32 This case does not exist when ®2 < ®1.
126The contract is summarized in equations (3.23)-(3.24). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2: Assume parameters such that ®
f
1 < ®1 (from (3.27) and
(3.40), respectively), that is, (1 ¡ 2q) > k(1 ¡ q). The principal's utility with a




> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
EUNM
































2[(1¡q)p+qRk] if ®= 1
(3.43)
where UH = V ¡ ¹ µ + qµ2
H=2, EUNM
P is equation (3.1), EUFB
P is the ¯rst-best utility,
and the superscript FI stands for forgeable information. After tedious algebra it can
be shown that EUFI
P (S) is continuous in ®. For ® > ®
f
1, it is increasing and strictly
convex in ®, EUFI
P (S) > EUNM
P , and EUFI
P (S) < EUFB
P (for p < 1 or k > 0).
EUFI
P (S) does not depend on z.




> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
EUNM
















2[(2®¡1)+(1¡®)Rk] if ®3 < ®
EUFB




P (A) is continuous in ®. For ® > ®1, it is increasing and concave in ® (in
particular, it is linear for ® 2 [®1;®2)), EUFI
P (A) > EUNM
P . Finally, EUFI
P (A) =
EUFB
P for ® = 1 and z > Rµ2
L=2p.
Fix all parameters and vary z to show the following results:
a) When z = 0, EUFI
P (S) > EUFI
P (A) (= EUNM
P ), for ® > ®
f
1. Supervising is
optimal in this range of ®. The same result holds as z increases (until z reaches a
value ¹ z1).




P (S) > EUFI
P (A) for ®
f
1 < ® < ®C
1 and for ® > ®C
2 , while EUFI
P (A) > EUFI
P (S)
for ®C
1 < ® < ®C
2. As z increases from ¹ z1, EUFI
P (A) increases for all ® > ®1, and
127EUS
P remains the same. Consequently, ®C
1 decreases and ®C
2 increases. De¯ne ¹ z2 the
value of the liability bound such that ®C
2 = 1.
c) As z increases from ¹ z2, ®C
2 remains equal to 1 (since at ® = 1, EUFI
P (A) >
EUFI
P (S)) and ®C
1 decreases up to ®1 (neither ®
f
1 nor ®1 depends on z).
Finally, when parameters are such that ®
f
1 ¸ ®1 (i.e.,(1¡2q) · k(1¡q)), ®C
1 does
not exist. Results a)-c) hold for ®C
2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Result 2:
The region of optimality of a supervisor is non-decreasing in the degree of adverse
selection R (which increases when µH increases). The proof is done assuming para-
meters such that ®
f
1 > ®1 (that is, (1 ¡ 2q) > k(1 ¡ q)), ®2 ¸ 1 (that is, the agent
receives some rent when audited), and q · 1=(1+ R). We show that the decrease in
EUFI
P (S) is less than or equal to that inEUFI
P (A) as R increases. Whenthis happens,
the cut-o® ®C
1 is non-decreasing, and ®C
2 is non-increasing, in R (that is, both S1 and
S2 are non-decreasing in R). Also we have to consider two cases:
i) The contract with a supervisor is such that ®2
f ¸ 1. De¯ne L0 = (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡
p(1¡®))+qR(1¡p®(1¡k)) and LH = (1¡ q)(1¡®)+q®R(1¡ k). After tedious
algebra,33 it is shown that @EUFI
P (S)=@R ¸ @EUFI















(1¡ q) + qR
¶
This result holds as weak inequality.
ii) The contract with a supervisor is such that ®2
f < 1. De¯ne L0 = (1 ¡ q) +
qR(1 ¡ k), LL = (1¡ q)p® + qR(k +p(1¡ ®)(1¡ k)) and LH = (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ®) +
q®R(1 ¡ k). After tedious algebra, it is shown that @EUFI






















This result holds as strict inequality.
The e®ects of a change in the liability bound z on the monitoring timing can be
seen in Proof of Theorem 2 (Figure 3.3).
Now consider a change in the e±ciency of side transfers. It is easy to check that
S2 (= 1¡®C
2 ) decreases in k, given that EUFI
P (A) at ® = 1 is not a®ected by k, while
33 All the steps to arrive to this result are available upon request.
128EUFI
P (S) at ® = 1 decreases in k. On the other hand, de¯ne the interval ^ S1 = ®1¡®
f
1
(from (3.36) and (3.40)), which is the subset of S1 for which an auditor is not hired.
^ S1 =
kf(1 ¡ 2q)¡ (1 ¡ q)kg
(2¡ k)(2q +(1 ¡ q)k)
There are opposing e®ects of k on ^ S1 in both numerator and denominator. The
interval ^ S1 is more probable to increase (decrease) for low (high) k. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3:
a) Supervisor: The agent's information corresponds to her type and the supervi-
sor's signal. The supervisor's information is his signal.
Consider the following direct mechanism: The principal asks a message report
a = (aA;a¾) 2 fµL;µHg£ f0;L;Hg to the agent and a message report r 2 f0;L;Hg
to the supervisor, and sets allocations and compensations according the following




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
f0;0;0g if a¾ 6= r
feLr;tLr;0g if a = (µL;r) and r 2 f0;L;Rg (a¾ = r)
feHr;tHr;k(tHL¡ tHr)g if a = (µH;r) and r 2 f0;L;Rg (a¾ = r)
The agent exerts e®ort e such that e 2 argmax t(m) ¡ e2=2. Her strategy
is ³A(µ;¾) = (a(µ;¾);e(µ;¾)). The supervisor's strategy is ³M(¾) = r(¾). Then
³ = (³A(µ;¾);³M(¾)).
Let a strategy pro¯le ³ and set of beliefs º be a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if
players do not have incentives to change their strategy at any information set given
beliefs, the other players' strategy, and beliefs are updated according to Bayes's rule
whenever possible.
Let a side transfer b from the agent to the supervisor be feasible for a given signal
¾ and manipulation of reports m0 = (a0;r0), if i) t(m0) ¸ b ¸ ¡w(m0) and ii) the
agent exerts e®ort e0 2 argmax t(m0) ¡ e02=2.
34 The value the cost C is recovered from the type report and e®ort recommendation from that
mechanism.
129A strategy s = (m0) is individually pro¯table for the supervisor if w(s) > w(³j¾),
and it is individually pro¯table for the agent if t(s)¡e02=2 > t(m(µ;¾);µ)¡e(µ;¾)2=2.
Let a collusive strategy cs = (m0;b) be coalition pro¯table for a signal ¾ and
strategy ³ if a) it is feasible and b) the parties are strictly better o®, i.e,
i) t(m0) ¡ e02=2¡ b > t(m(µ;¾);µ) ¡ e(µ;¾)2=2
ii) w(m0) + b > w(³j¾)
De¯nition: A strategy ³ is Collusion-Proof equilibrium if it is Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium and if there is no feasible and individually or coalition pro¯table strategy
for supervisor and agent under any signal.
According to the allocation rule above, we show that the agent's and supervisor's
truthful report of theprivate information and the agent's acceptance of the principal's
e®ort recommendation is an equilibrium strategy ³ that satis¯es collusion proofness.
On the one hand, neither the agent nor the supervisor has incentive to individually
deviate. If their reports of the supervisor's signal di®er (a¾ 6= r), they will get no
utility. The agent does not have incentives to change her type report (the rule satis¯es
participation and incentive constraints).
On the other hand, we show that the agent-supervisor coalition does not ¯nd a
feasible deviation. When the agent's type is µL, she earns no rent and the monitor's
wage is 0. Any mutual change of their report of the monitor's signal is not pro¯table.
Apossible deviationmay involve theagent changing her report to µH andthe coalition
changing their report to any r. In this case the agent gets a negative rent since
tHr¡eHr=2¢µ < 0 for any supervisor's message r. So this deviation could be possible



















for any supervisor's message r. Then any message change a0 that involves the agent
modifying her report from µL to µH is not pro¯table.
Suppose that the type-µH agent induces the supervisor to change their report of
the supervisor's signal (to some a0
¾ = r0). This is pro¯table from states H0 or HH
to HL and from HH to H0. In all cases the agent gains the di®erence in her wage,
but this is the exact amount needed to compensate the supervisor's wage reduction,
which violates conditions i) and/or ii) of coalition pro¯tability.
35 We also assume that a side transfer b from the monitor (supervisor or auditor) is valued kb by
the agent.
130b) Auditor: Consider a simpli¯ed version of the previous mechanism in which
e®ort is exerted before the auditing stage and only the type-µL agent is audited.
Now t and w (and z) are from equations (3.23)-(3.24). Any change of their joint
report of the monitor's signal from r to ~ r involves a change in agent's utility of
¢UA = (z~ r ¡ zr) and a change in auditor's utility of ¢UM = ¡k¢UA = k(zr ¡ z~ r).
Suppose that ¢UA > 0. Then this is the exact amount needed to compensate the
auditor's utility loss. On the other hand, suppose that ¢UA < 0. The maximum side
transfer is ¢UM, valued by the agent at k¢UM = k2¢UA. The agent's utility change
is ¢UA¡¢UM = (1¡k2)¢UA < 0. Then, no message deviation is pro¯table. Q.E.D.
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